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PANEL DISCUSSION

DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES (THE SAROKIN
MATTER): IS IT A THREAT TO JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE?*
INTRODUCTION

Dean John D. Feerick:**
This program is sponsored by the Association of the Bar's
Committee on Professional Responsibility. It concerns judicial
disqualification and was spurred by the Third Circuit's opinion
in Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc.,1 which resulted in the disqualification of District Judge H. Lee Sarokin. Haines was presided
over by Judge Sarokin.
That case involved a lawsuit commenced by Susan Haines,
administratrix of an estate of the deceased Peter Rossi. The
complaint in the case alleged product liability, tort and conspir-

* This panel discussion, which constitutes Parts I & II of this Article, was sponsored
by the Committee on Professional Responsibility of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York on December 8, 1992. The Review is grateful to the Committee and the
panelists for their help and participation.
** Dean of the Fordham University School of Law; President of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York.
' 975 F.2d 81, 97-98 (3d Cir. 1992); see 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988) (disqualification of
judges for bias or prejudice).
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acy claims against the defendants. The parties to the litigation
had a dispute as to whether the tobacco defendants should be
required to produce certain documents in discovery.
In Haines, the plaintiff contended that the documents
sought showed purposeful concealment by the tobacco industry
about-the dangers of smoking. The defendants maintained that
the documents were protected under either the attorney-client
or work-product privileges. In response the Haines argued that
the documents were not privileged and, even if they were, the
crime-fraud exception applied, thereby annulling the privilege. A
magistrate judge determined that the crime-fraud exception did
not apply. Judge Sarokin, however, found that there was prima
facie evidence that the defendants were engaged in an ongoing
fraud and that the crime-fraud exception did apply. Accordingly, he reversed the magistrate's order and found that the
crime-fraud exception applied to at least some of the documents.
The defendants responded with a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Third Circuit to vacate Judge Sarokin's order.
One of the primary issues presented by the writ was
whether the district court properly exercised its reconsideration
function under the Federal Magistrate's Act. Aside from the
substantive issues of the Haines litigation, an important issue
surfaced when the Third Circuit disqualified Judge Sarokin as a
result of that mandamus petition. The basis for the disqualification arose because of a statement contained in his opinion, finding the exception to the attorney-client and work-product privileges. In his opinion Judge Sarokin used the following language,
which the tobacco industry argued indicated his bias against it:
In light of the current controversy surrounding breast implants, one
wonders when all industries will recognize their obligation to voluntarily disclose risk from the use of their products. All too often in the
choice between the physical health of consumers and the financial
well-being of business, concealment is chosen over disclosure, sales
over safety, and money over morality. Who are these persons who
knowingly and secretly decide to put the buying public at risk solely
for the purpose of making profits and who believe that the illness and
death of consumers is an appropriate cost of their own prosperity. As
the following facts disclose, despite rising pretenders, the tobacco in3
dustry may be the king of concealment and disinformation.

975 F.2d at 97; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1992).
' Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 683 (D.N.J. 1992).
2

1993]

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

In disqualifying Judge Sarokin, the Third Circuit applied
the test of whether in the context of what he said in the case, he
appeared essentially to be impartial. The court held that the
standard with respect to impartiality and the appearance of impartiality was not satisfied, particularly that part of the standard regarding the appearance of impartiality based on essentially the above-quoted part of the opinion.
The disqualification of Judge Sarokin raises a number of issues. How far can a judge go in his or her comments without
appearing biased? Should judicial expression be restrained or
limited? Will judicial independence and authority be unduly
limited if judicial expression is curtailed? What is the distinction between impartiality and the appearance of impartiality?
What are the First Amendment considerations surrounding this
controversy? What repercussions will the increased litigation
costs resulting from judicial disqualification have on already limited judicial resources and the outcome of the cases in which it
occurs? These kinds of issues will be discussed by our very distinguished panel.
I.

PANEL DISCUSSION

Jack B. Weinstein*
I would be remiss if I did not first publicly express my own
and my colleagues' deep appreciation to the City Bar Association for its long and consistent support for an independent
bench. Without a strong judiciary, willing to speak and act in
favor of freedom and other rights, our liberties and well-being
would be in serious jeopardy. Without a strong, vigilant and supportive bar, judges could not be effective.
This meeting was called by the Association to discuss "The
Sarokin Matter." I may be disqualified because I have long admired H. Lee Sarokin as one of our ablest judges and most delightful companions. Nor am I in a position to criticize any decision of the Third-or any other-Circuit. I merely note the facts
to put the discussion in some historical setting.
For more than a decade, United States District Judge H.
Lee Sarokin has presided over product liability lawsuits against
several cigarette companies in the District Court of New Jersey.
* United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York.
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On September 4, 1992 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit ended his tenure in one of those cases, Haines
v. Liggett Group, Inc.4 Acknowledging Judge Sarokin's fifteen
years of "distinguished service" and his "magnificent abilities,"
the court took issue with Judge Sarokin's statement that "the
tobacco industry may be the king of concealment and disinformation."' 5 It held that this statement suggested a sufficient
appearance of bias to merit removal.' Judge Sarokin, taking the
hint, subsequently removed himself from the related suit
brought by Antonio Cipollone against the same defendants.7
This appellate decision is an important lesson in style for
district judges. Judge Sarokin would not have received the court
of appeals' approbation had he noted his disquiet at what he
had learned in presiding over the litigation by writing something
like, "There are suggestions in the record that might lead some
to conclude that there are elements in the tobacco industry who
have concealed information and misled the public." Not quite as
punchy, but more in keeping with the usually circumspect,
"judgy-wudgy" style that we all use."
Recusal normally can be expected to impose a burden on
courts, requiring the judge or judges to whom a complex case is
reassigned to learn the many details of a huge file and to acquire
abstruse scientific and legal expertise. The fiscal burdens on litigants are formidable, greatly advantaging the parties with the
most money-here the tobacco industry.9 In this instance Judge

975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992).
0 Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 683 (D.N.J. 1992).
1 975 F.2d at 98; see 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988) (disqualification of judges for bias or
prejudice).
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 466 (D.N.J. 1992).
8 The Third Circuit's ruling was not without its supporters. See Judge Forced Off
Tobacco Suit, A.BA. J., Nov. 1992, at 16 (quoting Professor Stephen Gillers's characterization of Judge Sarokin's comments as "sound[ing] more like Ralph Nader than Oliver
Wendell Holmes").
' Plaintiffs Lawyers Undaunted by Tobacco Defeats, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 27, 1986,
at 2 (describing how plaintiffs' lawyers face unlimited funds in litigating against tobacco
companies). The tactics of the tobacco industry to spare no expense in these cases are
epitomized by the statement of J. Michael Jordan, counsel for RJR:
[T]he aggressive posture we have taken regarding depositions and discovery in
general continues to make these cases extremely burdensome and expensive for
plaintiffs' lawyers, particularly sole practitioners. To paraphrase General Patton, the way we won these cases was not by spending all of [RJR]'s money, but
by making that other son-of-a-bitch spend all of his.
Brief for Defendant at 13-14, Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414
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Sarokin's removal may avoid the need for another judge to undertake the task if plaintiff's attorney is permitted to abandon
the case.10
Recusal or forced transfer of cases from one judge to another is not appropriate unless it is clearly authorized by statute1 ' or when there are most unusual conditions. Except in the
most egregious circumstances, the issue of case assignment of
district judges is a matter best left to district courts.
Circuit courts should recognize that micro-management of
federal trial courts is neither appropriate nor wise. The history
of the creation of the appellate courts reveals that they have
limited authority to control assignment of cases. 12 How the dis(D.N.J. 1993) (No. 84-678), quoting Brief for Plaintiff at 8.
10 The Cipollone family and its attorneys were permitted to voluntarily drop their
suit because the litigation was "too expensive." See Cigarette Suit Dropped, A.BA J.,
Feb. 1993, at 30; Cipollone Family Drops Landmark Cigarette Suit: Decision is Major
Victory for Tobacco Firms, WASH. PosT, Nov. 6, 1992, at B1.
The attorneys in the Haines case, Budd, Lamer, Gross, Rosenbaum, Greenberg &
Sade C'Budd Lamer"), attempted to withdraw because the litigation "hald] become an
unreasonable financial burden." See Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 9, at 7. After nearly
nine years of litigating eight cases, sometimes in conjunction with two other law firms,
Budd Lamer had expended more than $500,000 in out-of-pocket costs and close to S4
million in lawyer and paralegal time. Id. at 8. To gauge its expenses in Haines, the firm
relied heavily on its experience in Cipollone, which cost more than 1500,000 in out-ofpocket expenses and $2 million to try. Id. Budd Lamer urged the court to allow it to
withdraw because "it [had] become apparent that the amount of recovery against the
tobacco industry [was] not likely to exceed these costs." Id. at 9. The firm also argued
that from a public policy standpoint the benefits derived from its considerable work on
the cigarette cases, such as the revelations about the tobacco industry's practices, would
remain unaffected if they were permitted to withdraw. Id. at 9-10.
The court denied Budd Larner's motion. It rejected any argument that the firm's
expenses in other litigations should affect its position as representatives of this particular
plaintiff or that the firm's experience in Cipollone should serve as a financial barometer
for Haines. To the contrary, the court reasoned that Budd Lamer's work in Cipollone
had provided much of the groundwork for Haines and might result in more focused discovery, narrower issues and fewer expenses. Id. at 18-20.
Also influential in the court's decision was that withdrawal would impair the plaintiffs' ability to find substitute counsel or remain in the action. Id. at 20-25. Even if they
could find substitute counsel, the complexity of the case and the firm's wealth of experience in tobacco litigation raised serious questions about whether substitution would
prejudice the plaintiff. Id. at 23. The firm was ethically obligated to protect its client's
interests. Id.
Despite Budd Larner's contention that the public interest is not served by continuing lawsuits that are not viable, the court recognized the high public interest in the case,
apart from its profitability, most notably the unresolved question as to whether the tobacco companies can be held liable for their products. Id. at 44 n.29.
'" See 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 (1988).
" For a discussion of this history, see Jack B. Weinstein, The Limited Power of the
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trict court should divide its business is generally not a matter
for appellate intervention.
This philosophy of leaving management of district business
to district courts is reflected in the present Guidelines for Division of Judicial Business, adopted by the Board of Judges of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York in the Fall of 1988. As Chief Judge, I charged the District's
Criminal Procedure Committee, under the chairmanship of Edwin Wesely, Esq., with conducting a study of the manner in
which cases were assigned to judges in light of an increasing
number of large cases in the district. As part of its study, the
Committee considered problems associated with assignment on
remand and related choices. In revising the guideline governing
assignment on reversal or remand, we developed a system where,
in criminal cases, the clerk would randomly select a different
judge to preside over the case, reserving to the chief judge of the
district the power to order the case assigned to the original presiding judge to avoid placing excessive burdens on another
judge. In civil cases, the previously assigned judge would remain,
unless the chief judge of the district ordered otherwise. This decision was prompted in part by a disturbing number of decisions
in our circuit where the appellate court ordered reassignment to
another district judge upon reversal or for sentencing. We
sought to avoid peremptory reassignments by the court of appeals where claims of the partiality of the trial judge were made
13
for the first time in the appellate court.
When judges are removed after proceedings have begun, the
judicial system bears a heavy burden. Other judges must make
room on their calendars and educate themselves about a matter
that may be well advanced and sometimes quite technical. Even
a case in its early stages may have gone through extensive motion practice, which gives a presiding judge a good opportunity
to become familiar with the facts and legal issues. By hearing
competing versions of the facts and competing arguments on the
controlling law, a trial judge gains an intangible feel for a case
that is not available from reading a cold file. Lost are both time
and subtle impressions of lawyers and tactics that may provide

Federal Courts of Appeals to Order a Case Reassigned to Another District Judge, 120
F.R.D. 267 (1988).
" See id. at 267.
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the basis for more sensitive and productive management of the
case.
Toxic tort and other complex litigation require that a judge
learn more than the underlying facts and procedural history. A
judge must also become familiar with developing legal doctrines
and scientific disciplines. In mass torts particularly, the traditional system is sometimes ill-equipped to deal with problems
involving subtle issues of jurisdiction, conflicts of law, scientific
uncertainty, case administration and ethics. These problems
often require innovative ad hoc remedies borne of an intimate
understanding of the case. In addition to the burden on the judiciary, such re-education may cause a significant delay, increasing
the costs to the parties. Conservatism in recusal is particularly
required today when federal dockets are overloaded with cases
brought under an ever growing federal criminal code. 4
It is doubtful that the Third Circuit's decision alone could
have any significant effect on strong judicial case management.
The ruling that prompted Judge Sarokin's removal involved a
magistrate judge's determination that certain cigarette company
documents did not fall within the crime-fraud exception to the
lawyer-client privilege and were not discoverable by plaintiffs.
Judge Sarokin was asked to rule on the viability of plaintiffs'
fraud theory, namely that defendants knew about, but concealed
and, in fact, distorted the hazards of smoking cigarettes. He was
required to examine the facts presented by both sides to determine whether it was reasonable to conclude that the cigarette
industry had in fact attempted to mislead the public. Finding
"sufficient prima facie evidence of fraud in connection with the
public assurances made by defendants to declare that the crimein this matter"10 was an appropriate
fraud exception shall apply
16
exercise of judicial power.
A judge's finding on the facts does not reflect an improper
bias. 17 An unambiguous statement from an objective onlooker
U See, e.g., The Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-519.
15 Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 689 (D.N.J. 1992).
'6 Id. at 683-84.
17 See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 961 F.2d 260, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (recusal not
warranted after judge gave speech describing defendant unfavorably, as views were based
on judge's observations made during performance of judicial duties); Johnson v.
Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 1990) (recusal not warranted after judge referred
to defendants as "honest men of high character" during settlement conference because
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lets the parties know where they stand and it sends a message to
others who might engage in similar conduct.
No one should discourage clear statements by judges in either a civil or criminal context. When a judge admonishes a defendant at sentencing or criticizes attorneys for misconduct, the
parties and the system are well served. It should be no different
when private parties are involved. Of course, the basis for any
decision must come from the record; extrajudicial bias is
inappropriate.'
Earlier in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 9 the Third Circuit refused to order Judge Sarokin's recusal after he made several findings against the tobacco defendants, rulings that were
ultimately reversed. The basis of this earlier decision was that
"bias or prejudice which can be urged against a judge must be
based upon something other than rulings in the case.

' 20

The dis-

tinction between facts discerned from the record and extrajudicial bias-a point not considered by the Third Circuit in
Haines-is well recognized by other circuits and the Supreme
Court.2 '

I do not mean to suggest that recusal is never appropriate.
The disqualification of judges is governed by statute 22 and that
remarks were based on judge's perception of case).
1" Congress has specified particular instances when recusal is required, such as when
the judge has previously acted in private practice on the pending case, or when the judge
has a financial nexus with the litigation. See 29 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) & (4) (1988). In addition (and although one would hope this is no longer true today), a judge might hold a
bias against a party due to that person's race, religion or the like. See generally LESLIE

W. ABRAMSON,

JUDIcIAL DIsQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2d ed. 1992).
19 822 F.2d 335 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987).
20 Id. at 347, quoting Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31 (1921).
22 See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) (A judge's comment

on evidence does not require disqualification because "[ihe alleged bias and prejudice to
be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the
merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the
case."); United States v. Serrano, 607 F.2d 1145, 1150 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 965 (1980) (A judge's expressed frustration with failure of light sentences to deter
narcotics trafficking does not require recusal because "the alleged bias was judicial rather
than personal and.., stemmed from his observations in a strictly judicial capacity."); In
re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1316 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1102 (1989) (A judge's strong criticism of attorneys' behavior "does not demonstrate
bias, but ... [was] directly addressed to the conduct of the attorneys before him; [the
criticism] did not extend to extrajudicial matters beyond that conduct.").
22 See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988). An additional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988), also
governs disqualification in certain circumstances. Under both statutes the standard gov.
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statute should be followed. Recusal is required when a judge's
"impartiality might reasonably be questioned" 23 or where he or
she "has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party."2' The
statute was enacted to "promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process. ' '25 Thus, if a judge's impartiality
might be reasonably questioned, recusal is warranted even if the
judge in fact holds no bias.26
If misapplied, however, this statute can be used as a powerful tool by parties who wish to judge-shop. For this reason and
for those already discussed, the test must be strictly applied.
The Second Circuit, for example, has carefully limited the statute's application to those instances where "an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying facts [would]
entertain significant doubt that justice would be done absent
recusal. ' '27 Subject only to this limitation, when a judge acts on
knowledge derived from his or her capacity as judge, disqualification is inappropriate.28
Although there may be the occasional egregious situation in
which a judge is biased or inadvertently shows extrajudicial bias,
the disqualification statute is usually utilized in circumstances
where facts outside the record might raise a question of a judge's
impartiality. For example, the Supreme Court has required
recusal when the district judge was a trustee of an entity that
was closely related to the litigation.29
There may even be circumstances not explicitly contemplated by the statute that also warrant recusal. For example, I
recently stepped down from a criminal case in which the government was seeking the death penalty under the Drug Kingpin

erning disqualification is the reasonable person test. See United States v. Pugliese, 805
F.2d 1117, 1125 (2d Cir. 1986).
23 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
21 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (1988); see supra note 18.
25 Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 (1988).
Id. at 859.
United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1992); see also DeLuca v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 862 F.2d 427, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1988).
s United States v. Colon, 961 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1992); see also United States v.
Pugliese, 805 F.2d 1117, 1125 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067 (1989).
"' Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 847. In this case the district judge had forgotten that he was
a trustee. The Supreme Court held, however, that his presiding over the case gave rise to
an appearance of partiality and that he was required to recuse himself as soon as he
became aware of his connection with the litigation. Id. at 859-61.
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Act.30 After a different trial of the same defendant, I had
granted the government's motion for an upward departure from
the sentencing guidelines. The defendant, an alleged high ranking participant in the Medellin Drug Cartel, moved for my
recusal from the death penalty case, fearing that I was biased
against him. Although there is no statutory basis for recusal
under such circumstances, I treated the motion as a peremptory
challenge.
Some states allow defendants to challenge automatically the
first judge assigned to the case.3 1 A committee of this Association and our court considered such a plan of peremptory challenges of a judge and rejected it.32 Defendants in death penalty

cases are, however, afforded particular due process protection.
For example, additional peremptory challenges of jurors are
granted to both sides 33 and rules of evidence are more stringently applied. Given the unique nature of a capital trial that
these rules reflect, it seemed appropriate to permit the defendant to strike the first judge assigned to his case.
Shortly after its removal of Judge Sarokin, the Third Circuit removed another district court judge, this time relieving
Judge James McGirr Kelly of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania from an enormous asbestos class action. 4 Judge Kelly, whom
I also admire, had attended a conference where experts discussed the latest scientific discoveries about asbestos. He had
apparently forgotten that plaintiffs funded this conference and
that he had granted plaintiffs' ex parte request to use $50,000
from the settlement fund specifically for this conference.
The Kelly ruling presents problems quite different from the
Sarokin matter. It is possible for a reasonable person to question
the impartiality of a judge who attended a conference funded by
a party to the litigation, particularly when the judge himself authorized the use of the funds. It may not be unreasonable for a
" 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) (1988); see United States v. Escobar, 803 F. Supp. 611

(E.D.N.Y. 1992).
For a list of such statutes, see id. at 614.
See Committee Report: A Proposalfor Peremptory Challenges of FederalJudges
in Civil and Criminal Cases, 36 REc. 231 (1981); Report of the CriminalProcedure Committee, 111 F.R.D. 303 (1986). Both are discussed in Escobar, 803 F. Supp. at 615-16,
11 See, e.g., FED. R. CrIM. P. 24 (affording both the government and the defendant
twenty peremptory challenges in a capital case as contrasted with ten or fewer when a
less severe punishment is at stake).
" In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992).
32
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person "who [has] not served on the bench.., to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity" 35 of a judge who attends a conference sponsored by one party. Mindful of the potential appearance of bias, Judge Kelly barred anyone who
appeared at the conference from giving expert testimony. But
the Third Circuit decided that this solution did not go far
enough and it ordered Judge Kelly removed. I had been invited
to the same conference attended by defense and plaintiff counsel
to hear some of the preeminent experts in the asbestos-medical
field. I could not attend because of lack of time-I was trying
asbestos cases.
Judge Kelly had spent nine years presiding over the school
asbestos litigation, during which time he issued hundreds of orders relating to discovery and other pretrial matters.30 In its removal decision, the Third Circuit recognized that the newly assigned judge "will face a gargantuan task in becoming familiar
with the case."37 As with the tobacco litigation, it is not only the
new judge who will be burdened. The parties will face a lengthy
delay and will bear the costs of educating a new judge.
A less radical solution in the Kelly case would have been to
remedy the situation by inviting defendants to present evidence
or experts to counter the facts and conclusions presented at the
conference the judge attended. There were no secrets and the
papers presented were available. A reasonable person knowing
that Judge Kelly's attendance at the plaintiffs' conference was
inadvertent and that he had sought to remedy the error by giving the defendants essentially the same opportunity would not
have a legitimate concern about Judge Kelly's impartiality.
In the Agent Orange case, I tried to read-and still do-all I
could find on Agent Orange and dioxin. All that material is filed
and docketed so anyone examining the public record can know
what I have been exposed to.
It is, however, impossible to record all that we learn at conferences. Recently, I attended and spoke at the Rand Institute
in New York on toxic torts. What I heard there may influence
how I handle future cases. I also spoke at the Law Journal Toxic
Id. at 782, quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 86465 (1988).
36 Id. at 771.
37

Id. at 784.
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Torts Seminar. In both cases, my written remarks were substantially modified by extemporaneous changes. Moreover, I taught a
recent session of my joint Brooklyn-Columbia Law School
course in Mass Torts with a plaintiffs' lawyer in attendance to
discuss ethical problems of the plaintiffs' bar in mass torts cases.
All this, plus my attendance at meetings of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and the Law and at the discussions about DNA and statistics during meetings of committees
of the American Academy of Science that I served on, have had
an impact on my thinking. Is this experience any more a basis
for disqualification than the plays a judge sees or the books or
articles he or she reads on jurisprudence, all of which may have
an impact on decisions? Perhaps, as my children suggest, I
should go fishing more.
The Third Circuit was careful to hold that the problem was
that Judge Kelly attended a conference organized and funded by
the plaintiff, not that he had sought to educate himself about
the scientific aspects of asbestos litigation. The court acknowledged that a judge should seek to educate himself or herself to
improve judicial management.38 This is an important allowance.
The Third Circuit's decisions raise another difficult question I have already mentioned. When should the recusal decision
rest with the district and when with the circuit court? The
Sarokin and Kelly orders did not result from direct appeals after
final judgment, but from petitions for mandamus before entry of
an appealable order.3 9 Mandamus provides extremely limited relief.40 The Supreme Court has held that there must be a "judicial usurpation of power"; 41 that is, the district court must have
"clear[ly] and indisputabl[y]" abused its discretion. 42 Even in
cases of abuse, an appellate court may decline to issue the writ
38Id. at 778-79.
39A petition for mandamus may brought under the All-Writs Act, which provides
that "The Supreme Court and all courts established by an Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1988).
40 See, e.g., In re United States Dep't of Defense, 848 F.2d 232, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
quoting Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289 (1988)
("[T]he writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for extraordinary

situations.").
41 Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for the Northern Dist. of California, 426 U.S.
394, 402 (1976).
" Id. at 403.
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of mandamus and wait until direct appeal to correct any errors. 43 These principles operate to further Congress's strong policy decision of avoiding piecemeal litigation.4
Regardless of the procedure through which recusal is
sought, the particular nature of recusal should give appellate
courts reason for pause. Whether recusal is appropriate, that is,
whether a judge's impartiality is reasonably in question ultimately is a judgment call; a careful examination of the particular
facts and circumstances is required. s The district judge is best
suited to make this determination in the first instance. The Second Circuit regards the determination as discretionary and will
not reverse a district judge's decision to remain on or leave a
case unless the decision was a clear abuse of discretion.4 This is
the appropriate standard. If a judge shows a clear extrajudicial
bias or has a financial or other connection with a party, it would
be inappropriate for that judge to continue to preside over the
case; the circuit court must intervene. In the more common case
where the facts are fuzzy and a party is attempting to judgeshop, the district judge's decision should stand. Moreover, the
decision must be made in context. What would the cost of
recusal be? Was the judge provoked? Was the statement out of
character? Were other rulings balanced and fair?
After determining that Judge Kelly's conduct was so extraordinary that mandamus was an appropriate remedy to force
him off the case, the Third Circuit concluded that it might not
be necessary to vacate any of his post-conference rulings.' The
Third Circuit rested its decision to leave Judge Kelly's rulings
undisturbed on the desirability of avoiding the costs of relitigation. By doing so, it suggested that it did not itself doubt the
judge's impartiality, but relied on what some members of the
public might think.
So much of what jurors or judges do depends on their general life experiences that are not the basis for challenge. I am

43 Id.
44

Id.

45

In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1309 (2d Cir. 198s), cert.

denied, 490 U.S. 1102 (1989).
46 United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1992); Drexel, 861 F.2d at
1312 (where circuit court asks "whether the district judge's decision is a rational one

finding support in the record").
' In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 786-88 (3d Cir. 1992).
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reminded of a story told by the eminent District Judge Marvin
Shoob from Atlanta. In the winter of 1944, he was a twentyyear-old army sergeant. When five teenage German soldiers surrendered to him, he disarmed them and waited for reinforcements. When his lieutenant arrived and asked Shoob what he
planned to do with them, the young soldier said he did not know
what to do. The lieutenant ordered the enemy soldiers to lie face
down and sprayed them with bullets. He then announced to the
young Shoob, "That solves your problem." Judge Shoob found
the killing untenable. He vowed from that day on that, regardless of the consequences, he was going to do the right thing. 48
Nearly fifty years later, because Judge Shoob was "not the
slightest bit intimidated by the federal government," 49 he raised
questions about whether he was getting a sanitized version of
the evidence in a highly publicized case and whether the Bush
Administration had interfered with the prosecution. As a result
of his activist position, an investigator was appointed to report
on any government wrongdoing. Judge Shoob recused himself.50
Recusal was appropriate if the judge thought it was. But had it
not been for Judge Shoob's courageous actions, the case probably would have quietly gone away.
Another outspoken judge, Miles Lord of Minnesota, was removed from a case after the circuit court said he was biased for
shutting down a plant that was allegedly dumping waste into
Lake Superior, creating a health hazard to the drinking water.61
Later his actions again became controversial when he ordered
the makers of the Dalkon Shield intra-uterine device to produce
minutes of meetings when officers said they could not remember
anything about the controversy. The judge flew to the company's
headquarters to examine its operation. His actions resulted in
complaints from the corporation. Yet these actions changed the
entire nature of the litigation, leading Professor Laurence Tribe
to remark, "He has pierced the veil of corporate anonymity. He
knew from the documents and record what had gone on. I wish
the Supreme Court justices had some of his conviction and even
48

Mark Curriden, How Shoob Deraileda Plea, A.BA. J., Dec. 1992, at 12. I had an

analogous experience during World War II that strengthened my own resolve to try to do

what I thought was right.
49 Id.
50 Id.

1, Settlement

Ends Mine Dumping Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1982, at A31.
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his passion."52
In the early 1950s, another well known district judge,
Charles E. Wyzanski, in the context of an antitrust case, virtually restructured the deposition testimony planned by the defendant corporation when it appeared that a planned customer
survey would be inadequate. Judge Wyzanski himself called to
the stand officers of the principal competitor and in the summons listed topics appropriate for their questioning. The testimony resulted in a much clearer understanding of the industries
that were to be affected by the ultimate decision in the case.
In his eloquent discussion of the freedom and responsibility
of the trial judge, presented to this Association forty years ago,
Judge Wyzanski reflected that to establish norms of judicial behavior for himself, the trial judge has the difficult task of being
"critical of his own shortcomings, attentive to the reaction of the
bar, informed of the unrecorded practices of his colleagues and,
of the subtle differences in the tasks asabove all, reflective
'54
signed to him."
Judge John Sirica became the hero of the Watergate trials
by continuously voicing the feeling that he was being lied to and
by putting pressure on defendants either by taking over the
questioning himself at times or even by using sentences as a
means of extracting the truth. While he was criticized for his
lack of judicial detachment, the country thought justice had
been served.5 5
Judges Sarokin and Kelly, much like Judges Shoob, Sirica,
Lord and Wyzanski, are among the most distinguished and valuable of our trial judges. They were willing to say what they believed based upon what they saw in court. Of course tact and
style are important. When a judge goes too far, the press, the
bar, academics and appellate courts need to speak out. But, particularly in the delicate relationship between appellate and trial
courts, caution by appellate judges is required to prevent neu-

"' Mary McGrory, Sirica Set the Precedent for Morality Outweighing Manners,
WASH.POST, July 10, 1984, at A2.
L.
5Charles E. Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 Hv
REv. 1281, 1294 (1952) (discussing United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., Civ.
No. 7198, D. Mass, complaint filed Dec. 15, 1947).
Id. at 1282.
I"See Lawrence Meyer, Watergate Judge at Peace with Self, WAsit PosT, Apr. 9,
1979, at B1.
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tralizing judicial initiative and independence.
The independence of the federal judiciary and the necessity
of maintaining that independence are a critical resource for our
American democracy. The very first canon of the ABA Code of
Judicial Conduct reminds us that "[a]n independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society." 5 Commentary to another canon describes a judge as a person in a
unique position to contribute to the improvement of the law.
Judges are encouraged to participate in efforts that promote
both the fair administration of justice and the independence of
the judiciary. This commentary is especially important for district judges who are in direct contact with people who need help.
Their independence is crucial. Without it our system cannot
work.
In his opinion recusing himself from the Cipollone case,
Judge Sarokin wrote with his usual clear style:
It is difficult for me to understand how a finding based upon the evidence can have the appearance of partiality merely because it is expressed in strong terms .... I fear for the independence of the judici-

ary if a powerful litigant can cause the removal of a judge for speaking
the truth based upon the evidence, in forceful language that addresses
the precise issues presented for determination. If the standard established here had been applied to the late Judge John Sirica, Richard
Nixon might have continued as President of the United States.8 7

It is evident that Judge H. Lee Sarokin will not in the future be
unduly inhibited from exercising the independence that Article
III of our Constitution requires.
As for me, I shall continue to tell my law clerks: "Keep me
out of as much trouble as possible by suggesting blue-pencilling
what I write. But, don't inhibit me too much. Don't take all the
fun out of being a federal district judge."
Professor Monroe H. Freedman*
I find myself in a very awkward position criticizing Judge H.
Lee Sarokin, whom I respect and admire, and disagreeing with
Judge Jack Weinstein, whom I respect and admire even more. If
6

*

ABA CODE OF

JUDICIAL CONDUCT canon 1(A) (1989).
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 466 (D.N.J. 1992).

Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics, Hofstra University

School of Law; author, MONROE H.
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you will forgive me, though, I would like to talk about some law
on this subject, because it is easy for each of us to decide what
we think ought to happen in particular cases in the abstract.
Perhaps we would have written the relevant statutes and judicial
decisions differently, but let us try to consider the Sarokin matter in the context of relevant legislation and Supreme Court
decisions.
The section that is applicable in these cases is 28 U.S.C. section 455.5"- It is very different from the predecessor statute.
Before 1974, the judicial disqualification statute, section 455,
was expressly subjective. 9 The judge recused him or herself if,
in the judge's opinion, it was appropriate to do so. In addition,
the early section effectively established that the duty to sit was
to be given overriding importance. This early version of the statute was weaker in terms of effecting judicial disqualification
than the Due Process Clause as it was being interpreted by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in 1984 reiterated that in
order to do justice, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.
And so, during the pre-1974 section 455, ironically, it was easier
to disqualify a judge in criminal or civil cases under constitutional due process than under the judicial recusal statute. Section 455 was amended in 1974, replacing the subjective standard
("in his opinion" in the old statute) with an objective standard,
eliminating the duty to sit and broadening the applicable language relating to disqualification. The key portion of section 455
now reads: "any judge shall disqualify himself in any proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."6' 0
"[M]ight reasonably be questioned" is the standard and it is
mandatory ("shall").
In 1988 the Supreme Court decided Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.61 This was a case in which the presiding
federal district judge was also a trustee of the University of
Loyola in Louisiana. Loyola was not a party to the particular
case before the judge. But Loyola had a significant interest in
the outcome. The judge forgot any discussion that he might have
had about this significant interest. He did not relate, in his own

28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970).
'o28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
6,486 U.S. 847 (1988).
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mind, his discussions as a trustee with the case that was before
him. The names were different, the interest of Loyola never appeared in the proceedings and he just never made the connection. This conclusion was accepted all the way up to the Supreme Court. Almost a year after the case was over, the losing
party found out that the judge was a trustee of Loyola. You all
know how difficult it is to overturn a case that has been decided,
particularly one that was decided almost a year earlier. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in the case
and ordered it to be retried. 2 The language of the Supreme
Court is significant. Interpreting the statute, the Supreme Court
said, "The problem is that people who have not served on the
bench are often all too willing to indulge suspicions and doubts
concerning the integrity of judges. ' ' 63 Suspicions and doubts, the

Court said, is what motivated this very broad disqualification
provision in section 455. And so, the Court explained, to discourage these "suspicions and doubts ... the very purpose of section

455 is to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even
the appearance of impropriety wherever possible. ' '64 This is ex-

actly the reverse of the duty to sit where the judge was to recuse
him- or herself only in the extreme case that might override the
duty. In the language of the Supreme Court disqualification is to
take place "wherever possible."
And so, in the school asbestos case involving Judge Kelley,
the Third Circuit accurately reflected the Supreme Court's language when it stated the disqualification test as being whether
reasonable but suspicious minds might question the judge's impartiality.6 5 Indeed, the phrase "might question" tracks the statute.6 That is to be distinguished from the rewriting of the statute in the Second Circuit where "might" becomes "would,

'67

an

enormously different word in context, and "suspicion" becomes
' The Supreme
"significant doubt."68
Court never said "significant
doubt." It said "suspicions and doubt." You might agree with
62 Id.

"' Id. at 864-65.
Id. at 865.
"' In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 782 (3d Cir. 1992); see supra notes 3437 & 47 and accompanying text.
64

86

Id.

6 United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1992).
Ild.
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the Second Circuit, but I submit to you that if you do, you are
disagreeing with the Congress in its 1974 rewriting of section
455.
Now, the issue before Judge Sarokin was not whether the
tobacco companies had fraudulently misled people into thinking
that cigarettes were safe. The issue related to the tobacco industry research committee that had been set up with a view to litigation and was coordinated with lawyers for the tobacco industry who were preparing for litigation. At least this is what was
said. And so, on its face there is a lawyer-client privilege and
there is a work-product privilege that protects the documents of
the tobacco research committee or counsel. The allegation was
that because of the crime-fraud exception, documents could be
discovered from this research committee that otherwise would
be protected. What was before Judge Sarokin was not, again,
whether there was fraud or criminal conduct or covering up in
fact. The issue, as originally stated by the Supreme Court in an
opinion by Justice Cardozo, is whether there is prima facie evidence that the allegation of criminal or fraudulent conduct has
some foundation in fact.' 9 All the judge had to find was "something to give color to the charge" that there was a fraud involved
in the communications between the lawyers and the research
committee."
7
You have heard the quote from Judge Sarokin's opinion. '
Now I would like you to hear it in context of what was before
him-that is whether there was something to give color to the
charge-not the ultimate fact, which the jury was yet to be empaneled to decide at some future date. This is how far Judge
Sarokin went in the opening paragraph of his opinion: "In light
of the current controversy surrounding breast implants ....272
Why does this opinion begin with something as inflammatory as
the controversy involving breast implants? Judge Sarokin
continues:
[O]ne wonders when all industries will recognize their obligation to
voluntarily disclose risks from the use of their products. All too often
in the choice between the physical health of consumers and the finan-

"' Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933) (Cardozo, J.).
Id. at 15, quoting O'Rourke v. Darbishire, A.C. 581, 604 (1920).
"

72

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 683 (D.N.J. 1992).
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cial well-being of business, concealment is chosen over disclosure,
sales over safety, and money over morality. Who are these persons
who knowingly and secretly decide to put the buying public at risk
solely for the purpose of making profits and who believe that illness
and death 3 of consumers is an appropriate cost of their own
prosperity?1

The next paragraph in full is: "As the following facts disclose
despite some rising pretenders, the tobacco industry may be the
king of concealment and disinformation. '7 This passage speaks
to the ultimate issue in the case to be decided by the jury; it
goes far beyond what the judge at pretrial was called upon to
decide.
You will never guess what happened with that opinion and
its language. It made the headlines in the newspaper of the community from which the jury was to be drawn: "Judge Says Tobacco Firms Concealed Smoking Risk. '7 5 This is the ultimate issue in the case. The story was picked up, with similar headlines,
which seems to me perfectly reasonable, fair, and I think intended by Judge Sarokin, in The New York Times,76 The Wall
Street Journal,7 The Washington Post,7 ' The Chicago Tribune,7 9 and The Los Angeles Times.8°
In my view, Judge Sarokin was injudicious. Judge Weinstein
says that Judge Sarokin sent a message to the public. He sure
did. It is my position that this is not the judicial function, certainly not pretrial. I defended Miles Lord for something that he
said after a case was over, and the case was in the process of
being settled for there could be no prejudice to a jury or to any
other aspect of the case."' It was at the end of the case, based on

Id.
Id.
75Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 97 (3d Cir. 1992), quoting NEW
73

74

JERSEY

Feb. 7, 1992, at 1.
" Charles Strum, Judge Cites Possible Fraud in Tobacco Research, N.Y. TIMES,

STAR LEDGER,

Feb. 8, 1992, at Al.

Jonathon M. Moses & Junda Woo, Law, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1992, at B6.
" Judge Orders Files Opened on Cigarettes, WASH. PosT, Feb. 8,1992, at Cl.
79 Judge Rules Industry Hid Smoking Threat, CH. TRIB., Feb. 9, 1992, at C4.
so Tobacco Industry Concealed Smoking Dangers, Judge Rules, CHi. TmB., Feb. 7,
77

1992, at C7.
61On July 9, 1984 1 testified in St. Paul, Minnesota before a five-judge investigative
panel appointed by the Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit to hear A.H. Robins's complaints about Judge Lords's criticism of the company's actions with respect to the
Dalkon Shield.
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what had gone before in the proceedings. In Haines, however,
the statement came early in the case.
There is an additional point, not relied upon by the Third
Circuit, that I find important. Judge Sarokin is one of our best
judges. Judge Sarokin knows that after he decided that the
crime-fraud exception applies (remember that was the only issue
before him), there is a right of appeal. Indeed, in this very case
on this very issue, there was an order that no information from
these documents be revealed until the case was appealed. Yet
Judge Sarokin quoted from the documents in his opinion. That
for me is so highly injudicious, coming from a judge who I know
knows better, that it bespeaks more than the words in the opening two paragraphs. He never, I think, in any other situation
would have reached the way he did in quoting from material
when the Third Circuit had yet to decide whether that material
was protected under the lawyer-client privilege and the workproduct doctrine.
Another issue that persuades me that the Third Circuit was
correct (and this it did not rely on because Judge Sarokin had
not said it at that point): Judge Sarokin compared what he was
doing with Judge Sirica's conduct in Watergate. Now I do not
share Judge Weinstein's doubts-which I think may be tongue
and cheek-about whether the impeachment was a good thing. I
was, for example, the lead-off speaker in an impeachment rally
at Westbury Music Fair. But I also wrote an op-ed piece in the
New York Times at the time,8 2 and recently wrote a column in
The Legal Times, criticizing Judge Sirica.8 3 He may be a folk
hero, but he is one that no American judge should emulate, as
Judge Sarokin in effect has acknowledged he was doing. What
Judge Sirica did in the Watergate prosecutions was to spell out
for the jury, literally spell out, that T-R-U-T-H was more important in that case than the due process rights of the defendants.
In open court, before the jury, he said that "the court of appeals
can not tell me how to run my case. '' 84 Judge Sirica often re-

82 Monroe Freedman, Arrogance of Power, N.Y. Tm.is, Dec. 14, 1974, at A29

(editorial).
83 Monroe Freedman, Evaluating Sirica's Watergate Legacy, LEGAL T,'ES, Sept. 7,
1992, at 26 (editorial).
" United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013
(1975).
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ferred to himself as a "natural-born prosecutor." 8 5 Indeed, he
became the prosecutor in the case. Time magazine made him
"Man of the Year" for his success in breaking the case." He
thereby violated the traditional role of the judge in an adversary
system where the role of zealous advocacy is given to the lawyers
on either side of the case and the judge is required to be impartial and relatively passive.
There are remedies for situations where the judge believes
that because of a conflict of interest the case is not being litigated properly (as Judge Sirica had very good reason to believe
in the Watergate case). I remember one case where Judge Pratt
decided as trial judge that a case was not being litigated properly and that a party was not receiving due process of law; he
declared a mistrial.8 7 There is also authority that in criminal
cases, where the prosecutor has a conflict of interest and is not
prosecuting effectively, a judge has the inherent power to appoint-but not become-a special prosecutor. 88
Because of what Judge Sarokin said in that dramatic language that he had every reason to know would receive wide publicity in the community and way beyond, because of his own
analogizing of his act to that of Judge Sirica, and because of his
egregious act of quoting from the documents the privileged nature of which had not ultimately been passed upon, Judge
Sarokin's impartiality might reasonably be questioned under the
disqualification statute.
Professor Stephen Gillers*
I want to try to agree with both Judge Weinstein and Professor Freedman, which will not be easy. In United States v. Archibald Newbald8 e the Fifth Circuit considered whether a judge
should be disqualified because at the last of three trials, the
judge described a particular group of individuals as "a large
scale conspiracy composed of the most vicious individuals that

85 Robert L. Jackson, John J. Sirica, Watergate Case Judge Dies At 88, L.A. TamES,
Aug. 15, 1992 at Al.
88 TIME, 1973.
8 United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (D.C. Mich. 1977).
88 For a full examination of this issue, see In the Matter of An Application for Appointment of Independent Counsel, 596 F. Supp. 1465 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
* Professor, New York University School of Law.
89 554 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1977).
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this court has ever seen."9 The Fifth Circuit held that this
statement was not grounds for recusal because the judge had acquired that information in his judicial capacity, not in his extrajudicial capacity. Even there, recusal might be appropriate if the
statement reflected "pervasive bias and prejudice."9 1 But the cir2
cuit court concluded that it did not
In United States v. Antonelli 3 a judge in the Northern District of Illinois responded to a motion to recuse another judge.
The judge who wrote the opinion said that the other judge called
Antonelli "the most viciously anti-social person who has ever
come before me." 94 The ruling judge held that this was not a
reason to recuse the first judge. "Vicious" seems to be a popular
word.
Hale v. Firestone Tire,95 an Eighth Circuit products liability
case, involved a man who was injured when a tire rim blew off
the tire and hit him. The trial judge said repeatedly that he believed the rim was defective. The Eighth Circuit found that the
trial judge made this view known unequivocally."" Nevertheless,
it did not require his recusal because this case was going to be a
jury case; the judge had given his opinion mostly outside the
presence of the jury based on judicial sources, not extra-judicial
sources.9 7 There was one statement that the judge made in the
presence of the jury for which he was chastised, but it was an
insufficient basis to recuse him.
Finally, consider Alberti v. General Motors Corp.08 The District of Columbia district court judge in that case had previously
sat in United States v. General Motors.9 9 The judge said that he
would unavoidably be affected to some extent by the knowledge

11Id.

at 681.

" Id. at 682.
92

Id.

582 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
Id. at 881.
756 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1330.

Id. The court reversed on other grounds and noted "the district court's comments
which reflected its view that the rim was defective and that appellees should prevail were
unnecessary to the proceedings. We further note that judicial restraint and decorum
would be better served and advanced if district judges would refrain from maling such
comments." Id. at 1331.
93 600 F. Supp. 1024 (D.D.C. 1984).
9 99 F.R.D. 610 (D.D.C. 1983).
'7

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1063

he had acquired in presiding over the former case. Nevertheless,
the judge concluded that he did not have to recuse himself because his knowledge was judicially acquired.
These decisions demonstrate the great variety of approaches
to the issue presented in the Sarokin matter. I do not think that
you can use the language of section 455(a) quite as freely as Professor Freedman does. 00 I understand what he is doing. The
word "might" is a very powerful word. It is a wonderful word for
people making recusal motions because frankly all you have to
do is think of a logical progression of thought that a reasonable
person might have and you may win. I think that we have to put
more teeth into the word "might" than one would based on the
reading of the statute alone.
The Supreme Court's decision in Liljeberg v. Heath Services Acquisition Corp.101 has to be read against the astonishing
facts of that case. While it is true that Justice Stevens purported
to assume that the trial judge was unaware of the Loyola interest in the litigation, that is about as far as you can go. His opinion is dripping with sarcasm. I do not believe for a second that
Justice Stevens believed what he assumed. Furthermore, the
facts are rather egregious even if you assume what Justice Stevens assumed. So while there is very broad language in
Liljeberg, it has not been treated as broadly as its language
would tolerate. In my view, the reason the Sarokin controversy
is important is precisely because it is not like Liljeberg; this is
not a financial interest case. In Liljeberg the judge was fiduciary
to an organization that had a financial interest in the outcome of
the litigation, which was tantamount to the judge having a financial interest.
Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc.10 2 wakes us up because all
Judge Sarokin seemed to do was exercise his craft. He wrote
something. I imagine it can become monotonous writing judicial
opinions in the same style month after month. And the temptation is surely there to be frisky and to invoke metaphor and imagery. Some people do it better than others. Others do not have
the time to do it. But all of us who write for a living or speak for
a living, in one way or another, understand the temptation.

,00 See supra notes 57-86 and accompanying text.
1-1 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
102 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992).
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Judge Sarokin wrote, as judges often do, based on information
he acquired as a judge. His information was not exirajudicial
under what I take to be the dominant governing principal, including the one prevailing in the Third Circuit. His conclusions,
based on judicially-acquired information, though perhaps evincing bias, could not be the basis for disqualification.
Bias, after all, is what we want judges to have after they
gather information; it is inherent in their job. Another way of
saying "bias" is saying "point of view," "position" or "belief."
We are supposed to be affected by our beliefs, as Judge Weinstein said, whether we get them by going to the theater or by
sitting in court listening to evidence. Instructions to juries to
keep an open mind are nice, but we do not really expect that
people who hear evidence day after day over weeks and months
will not begin to fashion an opinion until the day they walk into
the jury room to deliberate. So other things being equal, it
strikes us as odd to remove a judge from a case for forming an
opinion based on evidence heard in that case, where the opinion
was formed in order to issue a ruling that the judge was dutybound to issue in response to a motion rejecting the claimed
privilege.
If that were all, we would stop right now. But it is not all.
Since it is not all, I ultimately have to conclude that the Third
Circuit's ruling was plausible, perhaps inevitable, although these
things are a matter of judgment. I say the Third Circuit's "ruling" because I find its opinion impoverished.
I have no problem at all with the second of the two
pdragraphs of Judge Sarokin's opinion. It reads: "As the following facts disclose, despite some rising pretenders, the tobacco industry may be the king of concealment and disinformation.' 0 3
If the opinion had begun with that sentence alone, no recusal
could have been justified. At best it is colorful. Colorfully, it
reaches a conclusion the judge is authorized to reach. The use of
the word "king" to suggest that the industry is the greatest concealer and disinformer among others, including pretenders, is of
no great moment. I do not think that even under the very broad
definition of section 455(a) that Professor Freedman advocates
we would disqualify Judge Sarokin for that passage. But that is
"I3Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 83 (D.N.J. 1992).
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not how the opinion began. It began with the passage: "In light
of the current controversy surrounding breast implants ...."-0o
The Third Circuit's opinion quoted those two paragraphs
and then went to quote the headline from the New Jersey Star
Ledger: "Judge Says Tobacco Firm Concealed Smoking
Risks."' 5 It then pointed out that national press had picked up
this story.",6 I do not care about the national press. I think that
is irrelevant; we do not count column inches to decide whether
judges have to be disqualified. I think a judge can be disqualified
for something he or she says from the bench whether or not
there is a reporter in the courtroom. I think a judge may not be
disqualified for something he or she says from the bench even
though it makes the world press.
How the press constructs or describes something should not
be the judge's problem. If Judge Sarokin had used what Judge
Weinstein quoted as "judgy-wudgy" talk,10 1 the national or
world press might have written exactly the same thing. Again, it
would have been irrelevant if Judge Sarokin said, in the language of the Second Circuit, that "a reasonable person could
find" or "there is prima facie evidence to believe" or "there is
probable cause to believe."1 08 The news story on television might
have been the same. We should not let judicial recusal motions
turn on the happenstance of press attention.
The Third Circuit opinion also discussed other cases, using
general language and emphasizing its own trust of Judge
Sarokin. 10 9 But there is very little in the opinion that captures
the essence, as a matter of judicial craft, of why Judge Sarokin
should not have continued to sit and what we are alerting other
trial judges to avoid doing.
As I say, the problem lies in Judge Sarokin's first paragraph. I have read it maybe two dozen times. It reads like Judge
Sarokin has joined a group of crusaders concerned not with the
evidentiary issue in this case, but with corporate culture and
with disinformation by the Fortune 100. That is the problem.
How do we explain that paragraph unless we hypothesize, quite

o Id. at 681.

101 Haines, 975 F.2d at 97.
3'

Id.

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1992).
10"Haines, 975 F.2d at 98.
107
100
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reasonably, that Judge Sarokin had in some way been carried
away and was no longer in the place he needed to be as a trial
judge. I think that is quite a plausible inference and it surmounts the word "might" as used in section 455, even if defined
with teeth. That is why I concluded after reading the Sarokin
opinion that there was the appearance of danger there. The
Third Circuit's opinion confirmed my view.
But I am distressed that the Third Circuit was so casual
and brief, spending only a couple of pages in its treatment of
this very important issue. The Sarokin matter needed more attention because it is not simply a matter of a judge's financial
interests. Everyone understands financial interests. We have
nearly a bright-line test for them. The Sarokin matter needed
more attention because it treats so nebulous an area. Trial
judges in the Third Circuit need more guidance.
I do not know if my conclusions make me agree with both
speakers. I suppose I agree with Professor Freedman that the
Third Circuit's decision was right. I also think that a lot of what
Judge Weinstein said is absolutely right. You can agree with virtually all of it and yet come away disagreeing with his conclusion. Ultimately, my agreement with the Third Circuit's ruling
rests on Judge Sarokin's decision to begin his opinion the way he
did.
Joseph T. McLaughlin*
No lawyer who represents or thinks that he or she might
ever represent an unpopular plaintiff or defendant before a
court can overlook the importance of the judiciary's independence. At the same time, with that great freedom the Constitution gives our federal judges comes a very heavy burden. That
burden, that price for their freedom, is the duty to be impartial.
It is not only the duty to be impartial, but as Congress and the
Supreme Court have interpreted that duty on more than one occasion, the judge must be disqualified if his or her impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. The question we are all asking
is if we value the independence of the judiciary and the impartiality required so that we continue to have the respect we have as
lawyers and as citizens for the decisions reached by the judiciary, then how do we make sense out of this Third Circuit Haines
* Partner, Shearman & Sterling, New York.
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case?
I come from Massachusetts and after attending law school
in New York, I returned to Massachusetts to serve as a law
clerk. One of the first things that my fellow clerks and I were
required to read before we began our duties was an account of
the Salem Witchcraft trials that took place in the late seventeenth century in Salem, Massachusetts. Ultimately, some
twenty-four individuals were sentenced and put to death for the
crime of witchcraft. Judge Samuel Sewall, who presided over
those trials, had the misfortune to outlive most of his supporters
and consequently had to deal with his critics some thirty years
later. When Judge Sewall tried to explain what he had done, because there was a transcript even then, he ultimately recanted
and apologized to the good people of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. He said he had been carried away by the passions of the times. Indeed, when you read about that time, it
certainly was a time of passion and fear among the people.
In trying to make some sense of the Haines decision, I reviewed some of the earlier decisions of various courts-decisions
where an appellate court was confronted with the heavy and difficult burden of reviewing the actions of a distinguished member
of the federal judiciary who had tried his or her best to do justice in a particular case. There were several cases that I thought
might help put Haines in perspective.
The first one is Berger v. United States.110 It was decided
by the United States Supreme Court in 1921. There was a wellknown district judge who went on to fame in other fields; his
name was Kenesaw Mountain Landis. He was presiding at a trial
in 1918, where six individuals were indicted for espionage. Each
and every one of them had a last name that, according to the
Supreme Court, had a German sound to it. The Supreme Court
quoted some remarks that Judge Landis had made in another
case sentencing an individual with a German-sounding name in
the same courthouse within weeks of his refusing to disqualify
himself from the Berger trial. Judge Landis said, according to
the Supreme Court:
If anybody has said anything worse about the Germans than I have I
would like to know it so I can use it.... I know a safe blower, he is a

,,0 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
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friend of mine who is making a good soldier in France. He was a bank
robber for nine years, that was his business in peacetime, and now he
is a good soldier, and as between him and this defendant, I prefer the
safe blower."'

The Court, after paying tribute to Judge Landis's reputation,
said that neither the convictions nor his decision to deny the
recusal motion could stand because a judge could not give the
appearance of bias or prejudice. If he did, it would undermine
the confidence that the citizens of the United States had in the
impartiality of the judiciary.
Some fifty years later, in 1973, the Third Circuit, interestingly enough, had several cases involving the consideration of
disqualification of a number of district judges. All these cases
involved individuals who had declared themselves to be conscientious objectors in the heyday of a war about which many of us
have read and seen movies of late and about which there are
many opinions."' But we know that, like in Salem, Massachusetts, those opinions were passionate. In these cases the Third
Circuit had to review remarks made by various district judges in
that circuit when they were sentencing conscientious objectors
who had refused to step forward for induction and who were
then convicted for the crime of wrongfully refusing induction. A
number of the judges whose remarks were analyzed in these
Third Circuit opinions said they felt a duty to pressure conscientious objectors into submitting to induction and that sentencing
them all to a uniform thirty months was the best way to effectuate the draft policy of the United States. The Third Circuit said,
"We think the personal bias alleged was of such a nature and
intensity to prevent the defendant, when convicted, from obtaining a sentence uninfluenced by the court's prejudgment concerning Selective Service violators generally."113 Such an allegation against a class is sufficient under the statute to require
recusal.
In this same circuit in 1992 the acts of a very worthy and
distinguished district judge were analyzed. One of the things to
consider when analyzing Judge Sarokin's action in Haines is a
fact to which not a great deal of attention has been paid, but it
Id. at 28-29.
See United States v. Townsend, 478 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1973).
1, United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 529 (3d Cir. 1973).
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is a fact you should weigh with all the other facts you have
heard. When the magistrate or special master ultimately made
the report on the famous documents and found that the attorney-client privilege or the work-product protection applied to all
of them, with the exception of eight out of some 1500 documents, Judge Sarokin did not simply review the magistrate's or
the special master's reports. He called for exhibits, transcripts,
briefs, and documents that had been produced in a related but
not consolidated, case Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.11 4 over
which he also had been presiding for a number of years. Now the
difference, of course, is that the Cipollone case was tried to a
verdict. A jury ultimately rejected most of the claims of the
plaintiff, the husband of Rose Cipollone, who had died years
before the case went to verdict. However, the jury did find on
one claim for the plaintiff and awarded him $400,000. That
award was ultimately vacated by the Third Circuit in another
unrelated proceeding. But it was Cipollone, in which a jury had
weighed the evidence and that had been pending for six years, to
which the district judge in Haines turned because, after all, he
was the judge in both cases. The difference is, of course, that
although Haines had been pending for four years, there had
been virtually no activity in the case; it had been stayed pending
a decision by the Supreme Court of New Jersey on a state statutory interpretation question involving the parameters of tort liability. Unlike in Cipollone, in Haines there had been no decision
on the merits, indeed not even a summary judgment decision.
But the court reached out for documents, briefs, arguments and
transcripts from Cipollone, where there had been a jury verdict,
which had been up and down to the Third Circuit on two prior
occasions, to vacate the findings of the special master and magistrate, to declare that the crime-fraud exception applied, and
then to remit the documents to determine how the crime-fraud
exception applied individually to specific documents.' But as
Professor Freedman noted, Judge Sarokin saved out of that pile
some five documents that were subject to the order holding that
the privilege would apply through an appeal. Yet he quoted
them extensively in his opinion.
Now it is certainly true, whether one looks at the Dalkon

",

683 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988).
Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 93 (3d Cir. 1992).
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Shield or asbestos cases, or statistics that are offered by the
American Heart Association that some 400,000 smoking-related
deaths per year are due principally to smoking, that the tort
field is in a time of national turmoil. Maybe it is a stretch to
compare the language of Judge Sarokin discussing members of
the tobacco industry as the "kings of concealment and disinformation," with the language of Judge Landis, who said he
preferred the company of safe blowers to the company of the
German defendants. But I am not so sure. When you look at
how the disqualification doctrine has been applied to protect ultimately the confidence of citizens in the judiciary and in the
impartiality of the judiciary, perhaps we can conclude, as the
Supreme Court has on more than one occasion, that it is the
task of the judiciary, in effect, to insulate itself from the passion
of the times, and not to respond to the cries of justice either in
Salem, in Judge Landis's court during World War I, or in the
district courts of the Third Circuit in the middle of the Vietnam
War. Perhaps a judge, although he or she should read and think
and understand these kinds of problems, should not express
himself or herself quite so colorfully and prejudge or appear to
prejudge the merits before the summary judgment motion has
not even been decided.
The language of Judge Sarokin's introductory passage is at
.best gratuitous. It forces us to go back to Liljeberg v. Heath Services Acquisition Corp.116 and ask ourselves what the Supreme
Court concluded in its review of the legislative history, notwithstanding Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent.117 The Court concluded that Congress intended to broaden the grounds for disqualification in 1974 to protect the impartiality of the judiciary
so as to maintain the confidence expected by lawyers and as citizens-confidence not only in our independent judiciary, which
we champion, but in our impartial judiciary, without which we
could not have confidence in the outcomes of cases.
The most recent disqualification case in the Third Circuit,
to which several of the speakers have previously alluded, is the
case involving school asbestos litigation." The Third Circuit described what the trial judge did in that case in the following lan11 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
117

Id. at 870 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

116 In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992).
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guage: "In high profile cases such as this one the outcome of
which will in some way affect millions of people, such suspicions
[as to the integrity of judges] are especially likely and untoward.""' 9 A reasonable person might suspect that the district
judge's plaintiff-subsidized attendance at the preview of the
plaintiffs' case would have predisposed him toward the plaintiffs' position. Alternatively, others might reasonably believe
that because Judge Kelly now knows that the plaintiffs had indirectly paid his way he might have been angry at them for compromising him and might have overreacted to the prejudice
whichever way, as the Third Circuit concluded. Removing the
judge was necessary to protect the reputation of the judiciary
and not the reputation of a single judge. Perhaps, thirty years
from now, if a district judge looks back on this kind of experience, he or she will mellow as Judge Sewall did and think of it as
a life experience. It undoubtedly must be difficult for any judge
who puts the time and effort that Judge Sarokin has into attempting to adjudicate very complex cases. In the end, however,
it is the judiciary we are trying to protect and not an individual
judge.
Judge Weinstein:
I am generally in agreement with what has been said. I
should like to just touch on a few points. I am somewhat amused
by the chastisement of the judges in the Vietnam War cases. 12 0
The decisions were designed of course in part to prevent the extreme penalties that were imposed by some courts. Their only
problem was that they were twenty or thirty years ahead of the
times. Now they would have to follow the Sentencing Guidelines
exactly. So they were premature guidelinists. There are also a
few technical problems that have been adverted to apart from
the style.
First, it is appropriate as a matter of judicial notice for a
judge to rely on what is in the courthouse and what that judge
has seen in court. 12 1 It has been traditional to go to other files
"0 Id. at 782.
120

See, e.g., United States v. Townsend, 478 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1972); United States

v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1972); see supra notes 110-11 and accompanying
text. I suppose I, too, must be chastised. See United States v. St. Clair, 293 F. Supp. 337
(E.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Lybrand, 279 F. Supp. 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
1 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
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within the court to determine generally what has been done. I do
not see anything wrong with a judge looking at what is in the
courthouse files. That is appropriate.
Second, putting the style problem aside, it is also appropriate to consult courthouse files in considering what the law
should be, that is, what the proper standard should be with respect to the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. Assume the judge had, in the course of his- analysis of the

standard, written something like the following: "In considering
this standard, we must take into account that in massive toxic
tort cases the possibility of secrecy can affect many people other

than the litigants, and we must therefore consider that secrecy
orders are more and more being ignored and cut down as a matter of public policy in this country. We ought to consider a lower
standard in a mass product case with respect to this kind of issue." '2 At that point it is appropriate, I believe, with regard to
the privilege issue, to repeat what Judge Learned Hand said in
connection with another privilege, that against self-incrimina§§ 200101] et seq. (1990).
22' Currently a national campaign is underway in the name of public safety,
spearheaded by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America ("ATLA"), to create a presumption of public access to all information produced in litigation. ATLA claims that
protective orders are being used to hide product defects and public hazards and it has
been pressing for legislation aimed at restricting the courts' discretion to issue protective
and sealing orders. These plaintiffs' attorneys have an interest in opening up the files for
other litigations. Yet, much can be said in favor of the public's right to know.
While legislation to limit protective orders has been defeated in most jurisdictions,
two states, Florida and Texas, have introduced sweeping reforms to restrict the courts'
ability to seal documents. Both provisions are facing constitutional challenges. The Florida statute prohibits a court from issuing a protective order that conceals "information
concerning a public hazard." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(3) (We t 1993). A public hazard is
broadly defined and includes a product that has or is likely to cause injury. Id.
The Texas rule establishes a presumption that civil records be open. To obtain a
protective order, a party has the heavy burden of showing a "specific, serious and substantial interest which clearly outweighs a presumption of openness to the general puble." TExAs P. Civ. P. 76(a) (West 1992). A court can seal the records only after deciding
that the interest at stake outweighs the broad public interest in access. The order, however, can always be contested after it is granted. The Texas rule is being challenged in
product liability cases involving the sleep-inducing drug Halcion, the antidepressant
Prozac and the Ford Bronco H. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Freeman, 847 S.W.2d 589 (Tx.
Ct. App. 1992); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 829 S.W.2d 157 (Tx. 1992).
In 1993 at least 15 states are likely to consider proposals to change the rules about
protective orders. Action is sought at the federal level as well. For a complete survey of
the status of legislation governing protective orders, see Product Safety and Liability
Reporter (BNA), Vol. 2D, No. 47, Part II Nov. 27, 1992.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 58: 1063

tion: you have to open the door slightly.12 3 It has to be ajar to
see whether there is a basis to conclude that there may be fraud
because our original assumption is that there is no fraud.
In opening that door slightly and in analyzing the case to
determine whether there is enough to open it further, we have to
analyze the facts revealed by that peek. How much of it do you
want to reveal? That is a matter of judgment. But there are
public policy aspects and technical aspects that lead me to believe that it is improper to criticize Judge Sarokin for quoting
some of the documents. Increasingly, any time there is a secrecy
order that comes before me, particularly in a case with a public
interest, I write after approving it, "subject to public policy and
to re-opening by the court." The evidentiary points, the public
policy points and these other points that are discussed all would
allow judges to consider the heart valve cases, 2 4 the asbestos
cases, 25 the Agent Orange cases 12' and the Dalkon Shield
cases 27 . in determining the proper secrecy standard. There is
nothing wrong with considering the nature of our current society
and the needs and protections that are desirable in ruling on a
secrecy application.
Professor Gillers:
I just want to put one additional frame around this discussion. When we talk about disqualification it is easy to think that
we are talking about fitness or unfitness. And it is easy to become defensive if you are the focus of the effort. That is certainly true in lawyer disqualification motions as well as judicial
ones. But disqualification really is a way of asking very important questions, whether it is lawyers or judges who are being disqualified. Those questions are: "What does it mean to be a lawyer? What are the limits on who can be a lawyer in a particular
situation for a particular client? What does it mean to be a
judge? Who can and cannot sit in a particular matter under particular circumstances?" Disqualification is a method for asking
See United States v. Weisman, 111 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1940).
e.g., Khan v. Shiley, Inc., 266 Cal. Rptr. 106 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
e.g., In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (In re Johns.Manville Corp.),
129 B.R. 710 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
12 See, e.g., Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co., 618 F. Supp. 623 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
127 See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 88 B.R. 742 (E.D. Va. 1988), a/I'd, 880 F.2d
694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
123

124 See,
125 See,
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these questions over time and getting different answers over
time.
So it is a testing procedure rather than a challenging procedure, although it can be used and abused. Now, unfortunately,
but perhaps inevitably, the Supreme Court has ruled that motions to disqualify-granted or not-are not appealable as of
right, but only as an interlocutory matter.12 8 So we are going to
be answering this question largely, certainly in civil cases almost
exclusively, at the district court level. We are not going to get
the kind of appellate review for those questions in the federal
system that we once had. Indeed, as casebook editors like me
know, if you are looking for recent cases on attorney disqualification, you mostly, although not exclusively, have to look at district court cases. The circuit cases are extreme ones, mandamus
cases, that do not really serve the pedagogical function. In large
measure we are losing a voice-the appellate voice-in the dialogue about what a conflict is and who may and may not be a
lawyer in a particular case. I think that is quite unfortunate.
Even Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.120 arose as a
rare post-trial attack on a judgment.1 30 So I think we have first
to identify the questions we are asking. They are legitimate
questions for society to ask. Second, we might reconsider
whether we have hurt ourselves in the interest of other policy
and efficiency considerations in largely excluding appellate participation in the solution to those evolving questions.
II. QUESTIONS FROM THE AUDIENCE
Dean Feerick:
Thank you very much. I would like to throw the discussion
open to members of the audience.
Judge James L. Oakes:
I have a question, a double barrel question for Professor
Freedman. First, Professor, were you not opposed to old Model
Code Canon 9 relating to lawyers, on the basis that appearance
of impropriety is a test subjective to the observer? And second,
12 Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 432-33 (1985).
129 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
130 Id. at 850.
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if so, how does that square with your rather broad view, I may
say, of section 455 as to judges, a view that emphasizes the word
"might" and does not emphasize the word "reason?"
Professor Freedman:
Judge, I am sorry to say that you are misinformed about my
position. I have written at some length in my book about the
importance of the appearance of impropriety, and I have explained the essentially political reasons that the concept was disapproved by influential major firms, resulting in the virtual extirpation of the idea of appearance of impropriety from the new
Model Rules. 131 But it is my view that the appearance of impropriety is extremely important for the very reason that I quoted
from the Supreme Court; to do justice, we must maintain the
appearance of justice. What I have insisted upon is that it not be
an appearance of impropriety in the abstract, but that we be
prepared to identify the kinds of improprieties that we are talking about. I see the appearance of impropriety as one of the important metaphors, justifications and explanations of what we
mean by a conflict of interest, particularly in an area where it is
so important that the public have confidence in the processes
upon which it relies.
Unidentified Questioner:
It seems to me that much of what has been discussed represents an unrealistic view of the way cases are litigated. Cases are
litigated from the start to create an impression as to the merits
of the parties' particular cause. In this case you are talking
about a very, very dangerous precedent. A litigant who finds
that the case is going poorly will make a motion to disqualify the
judge, citing Haines. Think about the impact on the other party.
I think it is wrong, frankly, and that has got to be addressed.
There are two parties here. What is the impact going to be on
the other party following a disqualification decision?
Professor Freedman:
One of the things that amuses me in cases involving lawyer
and judicial disqualification is the frequent line that this motion
is brought for tactical reasons. Well I would certainly hope so.
"'

MONROE

H.

FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING

LAWYERS'

ETHics 205-11 (1990).
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To bring it for reasons that are not tactically desirable from the
point of view of your client would be a violation of ethical responsibilities. Why do we never hear judges saying "I am not
sure I am going to exclude this hearsay testimony, because the
only reason that the lawyer is objecting is for tactical reasons"?
Yes, let us accept that lawyers are advocates. They are partisans
for one side. They do not make motions unless there is a sound
tactical basis for them, unless they are incompetent. Then, having gotten over that, we should move to the merits of the particular motion. I think that the arguments that have been made
here and in Congress on section 455, and in the Supreme Court
in interpreting section 455, are very weighty reasons for maintaining the appearance of impartiality: to ensure that people can
have respect for and confidence in the administration of justice.
Unidentified Questioner:
I recently tried a case that was pretrial for years and we had
a six-week bench trial. Four weeks into the trial, with the case
going badly, my opponent moved to disqualify the judge based
on comments that the judge had made about the credibility of
the witnesses. The motion was denied, but think about the consequences to everyone involved. This decision by the Third Circuit may be cited for the proposition that appearance alone may
be the basis for a disqualification motion. The question becomes,
what might a reasonable person believe under certain circumstances? What are the consequences of such a standard, not simply for the judiciary but the parties involved? The parties have
spent maybe a couple million dollars in pretrial and trial. All of
a sudden they have to go back and retry a case because the
judge has made certain comments.
ProfessorFreedman:
Right, it is called mistrial. It has been known to happen.
Mr. McLaughlin:
Clearly any tool that somebody perceives as useful may be
misused. For many, many years until we had a series of appellate decisions, I think most practitioners would agree that from
time to time motions to disqualify lawyers were abused. But
judges not only deal with these things on the merits, I think
fairly promptly, but we have all of the sanction power available
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if we think someone has made a frivolous motion. Whether we
look at it as vexatious litigation under the old statutes or we
look at it as something that is a violation under Rule 11, if we
happen to like Rule 11, we certainly have remedies if somebody
makes an abusive motion.
Professor Daniel J. Capra:
I would like to say that I see the judicial system suffering
from a case like Haines. The Cipollone litigation has been going
on for years and years. Now, Judge Sarokin's disqualification,
based on an intemperate comment in a written opinion, effectively results in a ruling on the merits. The Cipollone litigation
has been terminated because it is too costly at this point, after
all the money down the hole, to educate the newly assigned
judge. It seems to me that the judicial system suffers when there
is a disqualification under these circumstances.
I would like to ask a question of the panelists. I ran across
an opinion by Judge Bowman of the Eighth Circuit." 2 He criticized the exclusionary rule as being unfounded in the law, as
being basically a material reason why we have such a high crime
rate today, and as being a terrible rule generally. I am just wondering if a criminal defendant can move to have Judge Bowman
disqualified in a future criminal case involving the exclusionary
rule? I would also like to know if Judge Edwards, who has written against the sentencing guidelines, must be disqualified now
133
in any case in which a criminal defendant is sentenced?
Professor Gillers:
Again, I do not think either one of the cases described is the
same as Haines. We want judges to participate in the intellectual policy debate. The fact that they disagree with a statute, via
a footnote added at the end, or with a court-made rule, really is
different from saying "who are these persons who knowingly and
secretly decide . .

. ."

So it seems to me the Haines decision is of

a different caliber.
Second, surely there are certain things a judge, even in a
'3 United

States v. Jefferson, 906 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bowman, J., concur-

ring); see infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
131 United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., concurring); see infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
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case as complex and prolonged as Haines, might say that would
require recusal even if it meant the de facto end of the case. If
that is so, and sometimes it will be then our battle is with the
judge for doing it and the lapse of judiciousness that resulted in
the end of the case.
Third, this was not an intemperate remark by Judge
Sarokin. It was a lead paragraph in a well-written, obviously
carefully considered opinion, which as Professor Freedman has
suggested, echoes in its intimations in other parts of the opinion.
I wanted to mention a Second Circuit case that to me seems
questionable and, in its two paragraphs, insufficiently clear.
That is a criminal case in which Judge Keenan was disqualified
called United States v. Diaz. 3 4 After sentencing the defendant
on three counts and giving him a longer term on one count,
Judge Keenan was reversed on the ground that the latter count
did not statutorily permit a longer term.""0 He then resentenced
the man. Before he did, he wrote a letter to his senator, saying
the defendant was running a "drug store" and urging the senator
to file a bill to change the statute. Ultimately, Judge Keenan's
resentence was vacated because writing that letter was deemed
to create a doubt about his impartiality. 3 ' The opinion was
about as long as what I have just said. I am not sure why the use
of the term "drug store" in the letter required disqualification.
Of course, there was no press coverage. We needed a longer
opinion in Diaz as well.
Donald J. Cohn, Esq.:
My name is Donald Cohn and I tried the Cipollone case for
Liggett, so I have a different view than Professor Capra. He said
that he was disturbed that Judge Sarokin's disqualification was
the result of an isolated incident. But if you look at the record
before the Third Circuit, the motion to disqualify was based on
a whole series of decisions starting in 1983 or 1984 when Judge
Sarokin found that there was no preemption, a ruling ultimately
reversed by the Supreme Court. But Judge Sarokin is one of the
most courteous, charming, delightful people in front of whom to
try a case. He was always a gentleman. I could not believe that

13,797 F.2d 99
In Id. at 100.
In Id.

(2d Cir. 1986).
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this Dr. Jeckel would go in his chambers and turn into Mr.
'Hyde, writing the most excoriating opinions about our clients.
But it happened regularly. This was not an isolated instance.
I would also like to point out that at the end of the plaintiffs' case in Cipollone we made a motion for directed verdict,
which was denied in language equally as scathing, stating that a
jury could reasonably conclude that we were the worst people in
the world, had defrauded people, had concealed things. This
opinion was given to the press before we got it and was in all the
papers. The motion for a mistrial was denied. But as Mr. McLaughlin pointed out, the jury found there was no fraud. There
was no concealment. And the allegations were the same as in
Haines, because it was the same plaintiffs' lawyer. The cases
were filed at the same time. The plaintiffs went with Cipollone
because they thought it was a stronger case. Of course, once Cipollone went to Judge Sarokin, all the other cases went to him
as associated cases. If we want to talk a little bit about judge
shopping, the plaintiffs were very careful to file one case, see to
whom it was assigned, and only then file all the others. I do not
think that the dismissal of the case was the result of the Third
Circuit's insensitivity, but the fact that the plaintiffs thought
that they had no chance at all with any other judge.
My question, however, is to Professor Gillers. You talked of
pervasive bias. Here it was based on something in the record.
But where you have a judge basing opinions on the record over
and over again, which seems to show pervasive bias, is it really
necessary to have to go outside the record for the Third Circuit
to disqualify the judge?
Professor Gillers:
As I understand the doctrine in every circuit that has ruled
on the issue, excluding only the First Circuit, statements revealing bias based on judicial sources are not a basis for disqualification. Another way of describing that activity is to call it
judging. We want judges to form opinions based on evidence
even as the case moves along, so long as they do not irrevocably
form an opinion before the end of it. Some of the circuits that
take this view do create an exception for appearance of pervasive bias, which I read to be a policy decision to create an escape
hatch in the event that what the judge says is indefensible. I
think Judge Sarokin's first paragraph falls within the escape
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hatch. Perhaps that is especially true in light of other things in
the record that you have alluded to. In 1992 the Supreme Court
rejected a certiorari petition that would have resolved the circuit
split.137 Even within the circuits that do not generally permit
disqualification based on bias from judicially received information, there are divisions. So there are more divisions than just
two. But the Court rejected certiorari with two dissenting
votes-Justices O'Connor and White-and it may be that eventually the issue will be resolved.
Unidentified Questioner:
I wonder if there is not a difference that is more than semantic between injudicious conduct on the part of a judge, the
term Professor Freedman applied to Judge Sarokin, and bias,
prejudgment, the proper remedy for which is recusal. To a certain extent it sounds to me like Judge Sarokin made mistakes
rather than demonstrated a personal bias, either out of animus
or financial interest.
Professor Freedman:
Well, I may have, without frankly thinking of it, used a
softer word than I might have in saying injudicious. What I was
trying to suggest is that Judge Sarokin acted in a way that was
uncharacteristic of a judge of his caliber, which seemed to me to
betray a bias in the case. As I said, I cannot imagine that Judge
Sarokin in another context, knowing that the issue of whether
these documents are privileged is appealable, would moot the issue by exposing them in his opinion, thereby effectively preventing the court of appeals from performing its role in appellate
review. I did not mean to say, for example, that his reference to
Judge Sirica constituted bias. What I was suggesting was that
his comment provides circumstantial evidence of the bias that
Judge Sarokin had already demonstrated in his opening words.
But I would add that I do not find it necessary to go so far as to
say it was a calculated effort to publicize Judge Sarokin's strong
views about the villains of the tobacco industry. Rather, at best
it was reckless. Any reasonable person would have known that
those remarks were going to be publicized in the very commu137 United

2321 (1992).

States v. Waller, 951 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
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nity from which the jury was to be drawn. That injudicious conduct seemed to me to provide substantial circumstantial evidence of a mindset that was significantly less than impartial.
Unidentified Questioner:
Given everything that I heard said about the Haines case, it
is indeed a mystery why Judge Sarokin did what he did. It is not
realistic to think that he could not have foreseen this result.
Could each of the panelists respond to what might have driven
him, a man of this caliber and wisdom? Could it have been
something in the record, some conduct by the tobacco company
that would have provoked even a saint?
Professor Gillers:
I could say it is spending your days in Newark. I have met
Judge Sarokin several times. We have been on panels together.
Let us assume that he watched the tobacco companies, no offense to Mr. Cohn, litigate to the hilt-you know, demand that
every "t" be crossed and not give an inch-and watched the
plaintiffs' lawyers working on contingencies suffer mightily. Perhaps he felt that the process was taking over the goal of justice
and was drowning it. Let us also assume that Judge Sarokin felt
strongly about the product and its danger, of which we get repeated warning. It may be that he concluded that this was the
way he was going to make a statement within the case about the
bigger picture. Obviously it meant a great deal to him to see that
justice was done here. But what I walk. away with is the abiding
view that he stepped out of role. We all do that all the time.
Thank God I have tenure. Article III protects him as well. 138 But
he stepped out of role and he did it not on the spur of the moment, not in the heat of passion and not from the bench in response to provocation from a lawyer. Judge Sarokin did it in a
studied and contemplative way.
Every lawyer and every writer knows that the first sentence
of the first paragraph of what he or she writes is the most important. Judge Sarokin had time to catch himself, and he did not.
Ultimately, that is what required the result, although it could
38 U.S. CONST., art. III.
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have been better explained by the Third Circuit.
Professor Freedman:
I am not going to psychoanalyze the judge, but I can tell
you my own reactions, having written a column in the Legal
Times"3 9 this week in which I say some things about the tobacco
industry that are considerably harsher than what Judge Sarokin
said. I have accused them of killing over 1000 people every day
of the week, every week of the year, and being determined to
keep on doing it.140 I said also that poor Dr. Kovorkian is simply
using the wrong technology in the half a dozen or so people that
he has helped to commit suicide. But the important difference
between me and Judge Sarokin is not our sense of outrage over
the peddling of a lethal and addictive product, but that I am a
law professor writing a column and he is a judge who was at the
beginning of a case in which the jury had not yet been selected.
Again, there were references to his simply deciding the issue
that was before him. But as I tried to make clear, his opinion
went significantly beyond what was necessary to decide the issue
before him. That is not always a fault. But when it is done so
dramatically, in a way that any reasonable person would have
foreseen was going to garner the publicity that it did, that is, I
was going to say inexcusable, and decided to say injudicious.
Unidentified Questioner:
To the extent that we talk about bias or other kinds of misbehavior, I am not troubled. But a standard such as appearance
of impropriety brings back echoes of "I know it when I see it." If
a legislative body made it a misdemeanor to act in public with
an appearance of impropriety, it is as likely as not that such a
norm would be struck down as void for vagueness. When you
couple it with an actual bias claim, we understand it. If a judge
took a bribe and we coupled the accusation of bribery with the
appearance of impropriety, the bribery accusation would be illuminated. But to the extent that it is an independent rationale, I
do not profess to have no sense of what appearance of impropriety means, but I do not think it provides a standard of conduct.
131Monroe Freedman, Gov. Clinton's Ethics in Transition, LEAc
1992, at 23.
140

Id.

Ti'Lms, Dec. 7,
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I think it is a cliche. I think it has introduced a good deal of
confusion into the whole area of judicial and lawyer ethics.
Professor Freedman:
Well, that was the point that I tried to make in responding
to Judge Oakes; it cannot be impropriety at large. It has to be
related to a specific impropriety. For a lawyer that may be a lack
of zeal, a violation of confidentiality, or a failure to communicate
information to the client that is material to the client's case.
With a judge, an appearance of impropriety means an appearance that the judge is less than impartial. I agree with you completely. But I do not see the inconsistency because I insist on
relating the concept to specific wrongdoing. The point, however,
is when you are talking about an appearance of impropriety, you
do not have to show that a judge is in fact partial, as the Supreme Court, as well as the reporter to the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Congress have expressed it, the standard is if a
reasonable person could suspect that a judge is partisan.
Professor Gillers:
First, the "appearance of impropriety" language for lawyers
only appeared in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 141 The
ABA rejected it even when the Code was extant.142 Of course in
this circuit, we have Judge Feinberg's wonderful opinion in
Board of Education v. Nyquist,1 43 in which he said the "appearance" test was "too slender a reed" on which to base disqualification. I bless the Second Circuit's departure. However, because
New York State retains the Code, we still have the "appearance"
language, and some judges have used it here.' 44 It is important
to recognize that the language is neither the language of section
455(a) 145 nor is it the language of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, whose subject is disqualification. 14 "Impartiality
141

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980).

ABA, Formal Op. 342 (1975).
1-3590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979).
144 See, e.g., Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
'4"Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C.
14

§

455(a) (1988).

146 "A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned." ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 3C(1).
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might reasonably be questioned" is the language. That is the
right standard, although it is broader than the standard for lawyer disqualification. Judges and lawyers are different in one critical way. Judges exercise public power. Lawyers exercise private
power, unless they are public officials, in which case a broader
standard is also appropriate for them. We demand something by
way of appearances from people in positions of public trust that
we generally have not demanded from people who exercise private power. That is the correct response. Ordinarily, all that
happens to the person in a position of public trust is that he or
she is denied the opportunity to participate in a particular decision because of how it will reasonably look to others. That is not
a legitimate standard for denying a private lawyer the right to
participate in private representation.
Dean Feerick:
I would just make the observation that in other areas the
concept of appearance as a standard, as unclear as it might be, is
grounded in a sense of need for public confidence in our system.
There is conduct that raises issues that go to confidence in the
system that falls within the appearance of the impropriety rubric we have heard discussed here tonight.
I would like to ask Judge Weinstein a final question. This is
not an area that I have spent a great deal of time thinking
about. I have read the Haines case. I came here believing that
this was a situation of monumental importance to the Bar and
the judiciary. Obviously there has been a great deal of discussion
about this subject recently. But I have heard comments from
Professor Freedman, Professor Gillers, Mr. McLaughlin and
others that lead me to wonder if we have made more of this case
in terms of a threat to the independence of the judiciary than
should be made based on what was said by Judge Sarokin and
its context. Is this really a result that will chill the free speech of
federal judges and really compromise the judicial function in
any significant way?
Judge Weinstein:
The answer is no. It is not going to chill anybody I know.
We Article I judges will be here when the next president is
gone, and the president after that. Nobody is going to chill us.
But power does corrupt judges and everybody else. It is appro-
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priate, therefore, to remind individual judges and the judiciary
as a whole when either style or substance oversteps reasonable
bounds. It is appropriate for appellate courts to do so, but with a
minimum of resort to recusal, which is so costly. It is appropriate for the -bar to criticize judges because individual litigants
cannot. It is particularly appropriate for law reviews and
academia to do so. So I congratulate this audience and the bar
once again for this very instructive program.
III.

FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
AND LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL DISCOURSE

Daniel J. Capra*
Federal judges in written opinions often contribute to legal
dialogue in a manner that goes well beyond the interests and
concerns of the parties before them. Two recent examples are
illustrative.
Example 1: Judge Bowman of the Eighth Circuit, in United
States v. Jefferson,147 wrote a concurring opinion in a case in
which the entire court agreed that evidence obtained in a stop
made without reasonable suspicion was properly excluded from
the defendant's trial. Judge Bowman wrote specially to state
that the case "vividly illustrates the perversity of the exclusionary rule.' 148 He went on to excoriate the exclusionary rule as
partly responsible for the increase of crime in America and as a
blank check for defendants who "exit unpunished, free to continue dealing illegal drugs to the pathetic addicts and contemptible scofflaws who comprise the national market for these
substances.'

49

Example 2: Many judges in written opinions have taken
pot-shots at the Federal. Sentencing Guidelines. For example,
00
Judge Edwards, concurring in United States v. Harrington,
wrote that "[1]ike the Emperor's new clothes, the Sentencing
Guidelines are a bit of a farce. ' 5' He expressed "profound con* Professor of Law, Fordharn University School of Law; Chair, Committee on Professional Responsibility, Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
147 906 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bowman, J., concurring).
148 Id. at 352.
149
Zo

Id.
947 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., concurring).
Id. at 964 (Edwards, J., concurring).
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cerns about the efficacy of the Guideline system" and concluded
that the Guidelines do not meet their stated goal of promoting
uniformity and fairness in sentencing. 152
The above examples concern judicial discourse in the context of a written opinion. Similar contributions to legal dialogue
from the federal judiciary may occur in the form of law review
articles and published speeches. For example, Judge Grady has
often written and spoken against contingent fees. 1 3 Before Justice Rehnquist was appointed to the Supreme Court, he took a
written position on a ripeness question that was later before him
on the Court.5 4 And of course Justice Thomas, before his appointment to the Supreme Court, expressed in writing some affinity for a Natural Law theory of the Constitution. 60
Consider, in this brew of judicial activity, the language used
by Judge H. Lee Sarokin in a written opinion in Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc.156 Haines was a personal injury action brought
against the tobacco industry under diversity jurisdiction. Haines
had served a discovery request, seeking documents relating to
the Council for Tobacco Research, which was formed by several
cigarette manufacturing companies to conduct scientific research
15' Id. Judicial criticism of the Sentencing Guidelines has reached the level of a chorus. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 943 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1991) (Heaney, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029 (2d Cir. 1991)
(Oakes, C.J.); United States v. Andruska, 964 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1992) (Will, J., concurring) ("I am compelled to write separately to emphasize that the irrationality and draconian nature of the Guidelines sentencing process is again unhappily reflected in this case
.... "); United States v. Baker, 961 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1992) (Bright, J., concurring)
("This case is another example of rigid guidelines producing inequity and injustice in
sentencing, and demonstrates a need for the reformation, if not the abolishment, of
Guideline sentencing."). Federal judges have also taken to law reviews to criticize the
Guidelines. See, e.g., Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland, Some Thoughts on the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, 31 ViL. L R v. 1291 (1986); Gerald IV. Heaney, The Reality of
Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity,28 Ams. Caw. L Rgv. 161 (1991).
253 See John F. Grady, Some Ethical Questions About Percentage Fees, 2 LrrATION 20 (1976); Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R, 692 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1982) (refusing to
disqualify Judge Grady from a case challenging a contingent fee).
' See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 839 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., memorandum)
(stating that "it is not a ground for disqualification that a judge has prior to his nomination expressed his then understanding of the meaning of some particular provision of the
Constitution").
I See, e.g., Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Pri, ileges and
Immunities Clause of the FourteenthAmendment, 12 HARv. J.L. & Pu. PoL'v 63 (19S9);
Clarence Thomas, Toward a "Plain Reading" of the Constitution-The Declarationof
Independence in Constitutional Interpretation,30 How. L.J. 983 (1987).
1" 140 F.R.D. 681 (D.N.J.), re'd, 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992).
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on health hazards from smoking. The tobacco defendants refused to produce approximately 1500 documents, asserting the
attorney-client and work-product privileges. Eventually, Judge
Sarokin issued an opinion concluding that many of the documents were subject to disclosure under the crime-fraud exception to the privilege. He stated that he would appoint a special
master to review the remaining documents to determine whether
they were also subject to the crime-fraud exception. In the prologue to his opinion on the discovery issue, Judge Sarokin, in
language that is carefully parsed by the panelists, excoriated the
tobacco industry for its hardball litigation tactics in the discovery process. Judge Sarokin began his opinion as follows:
In light of the current controversy surrounding breast implants, one

wonders when all industries will recognize their obligation to voluntarily disclose risks from the use of their products. All too often in the
choice between the physical health of consumers and the financial
well-being of business, concealment is chosen over disclosure, sales
over safety, and money over morality. Who are these persons who
knowingly and secretly decide to put the buying public at risk solely
for the purpose of making profits and who believe that illness and
death of consumers is an appropriate cost of their own prosperityl As
the following facts disclose, despite some rising pretenders, the to87
bacco industry may be the king of concealment and disinformation.

On the basis of this language, the tobacco industry requested that the Third Circuit exercise its supervisory power to
disqualify Judge Sarokin from further proceedings in the case.
The court of appeals held that Judge Sarokin was in fact capable of handling the case free from bias or prejudice. Nonetheless,
the court disqualified Judge Sarokin because the above two
paragraphs gave an "appearance" of bias against the tobacco industry. 15 The court concluded that "it is impossible for us to
vindicate the requirement of appearance of impartiality in view
of the statements made in the district court's prologue to its
opinion."'I5 The upshot was that Judge Sarokin was disqualified
not only from Haines, but also from any related tobacco litigation to which he had been assigned, including the famous Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.6 0 litigation. While the Haines case
1" 140 F.R.D. at 683.
,68975 F.2d at 98.
Id.
Io
799 F. Supp. 466 (D.N.J. 1992) (recusal in light of the disqualification in Haines).
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was at a preliminary stage, the Cipollone litigation had already
reached judgment, a decision by the Supreme Court and a remand to the district court for a new trial. Shortly after Judge
Sarokin's disqualification, counsel for Cipollone obtained dismissal of the case. Speculation for the true reason for counsel's
throwing in the towel comes from both sides. Those sympathetic

to the plaintiffs reason that it would have been too costly to educate another judge on the sophisticated scientific issues involved in tobacco litigation. Those sympathetic to the defend-

ants claim that counsel succumbed because it would have been
impossible to find a judge as biased against the tobacco industry

as Judge Sarokin was. Whichever point of view is correct, it is
clear that the disqualification of Judge Sarokin in Haines has

had the identical practical effect as a dismissal on the merits in
Cipollone-a consequence of which the Third Circuit took no
account. 6I l
In none of the above examples has a judge been disqualified
for contributing to the legal dialogue or for staking out a position on a legal question that may be contrary to the position of a
party in a particular case before the judge. As noted, Justice
Rehnquist refused to disqualify himself from a ripeness case
even though he wrote a memorandum on that point of law in-

let The law firm of Budd Lamer was counsel for the plaintiffs in both Cipollone and
Haines.It had taken the cases on a contingent fee basis. After the disqualification order
in Haines,Budd Lamer made a judgment that the proceedings had become an unreasonable financial burden on the firm, and that the amount of recovery from the tobacco
industry was unlikely to exceed the costs. See Henry J. Reske, CigaretteSuit Dropped,
A.BA J., Feb. 1993, at 30.
While Budd Lamer was able to terminate the Cipollone litigation with the plaintiff's
consent, the plaintiff in Haines wishes to pursue the litigation before another judge. Recently it was reported that Judge Lechner denied Budd Lamer's motion to withdraw
from the Haines litigation. Judge Lechner stated that Budd Lamer could not withdraw
merely because it was "ill at ease because the contract it made may not be lucrative."
Law Firm Ordered to Continue in Cigarettes Suit, N.Y. Thms, Jan. 29, 1993, at B5.
That the Third Circuit is rather unsympathetic to the costs imposed by judicial
disqualification is also shown in the recent case of In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d
764 (3d Cir. 1992), where the court disqualified Judge Kelly for attending a seminar
sponsored by the plaintiffs, even though it acknowledged that "the newly assigned district judge will face a gargantuan task in becoming familiar with the case" and that "the
delay may disadvantage the plaintiffs." Id. at 784. The court ordered disqualification
even though Judge Kelly proposed less onerous alternatives such as disqualifying plaintiff's experts who appeared at the seminar, and even though Judge Kelly had presided
over this nationwide litigation for nine years. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying
text.
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volved in the case while working for the Solicitor General. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that no law or rule guarantees a litigant
"that each judge will start off from dead center in his willingness
or ability to reconcile the opposing arguments of counsel with
his understanding of the Constitution and the law. '162 Likewise,

the Seventh Circuit refused to disqualify Judge Grady from a
case challenging a contingent fee, reasoning that he was not required to recuse himself "merely because he holds and had expressed certain views on that general subject.

' 163

Nobody has

contended that Judge Bowman should be disqualified from deciding Fourth Amendment cases or that Judge Edwards should
be disqualified from Sentencing Guidelines cases.16 4 In each of
these situations, the courts presume that a judge can put aside
his or her views about how the law should be and apply the law
as it is to the facts presented. In each case the judge's written
opinion is considered by most to be a positive contribution to
legal dialogue and even legal reform.
What was so different about the opinion of Judge Sarokin
that the radical remedy of disqualification was required? It cannot simply be, as Professor Freedman seems to imply in his contribution to this Panel, that Judge Sarokin went well beyond the
facts of the case to discuss issues like breast implants and mass
tort defendants in general. A judge cannot be disqualified simply
for relating one social problem to another presented by the facts
of the case before him or her. Certainly, Judge Bowman's vitriolic comments about the exclusionary rule were far afield from
the particulars of the case, in which all the judges agreed that
the law required the exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence.
It could be argued, however, that Judge Sarokin crossed the
line by appearing to pre-decide the merits of the case, and by
criticizing the tobacco industry at a case-specific level, rather
than merely advocating legal reform or criticizing some general
"I Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 839 (1972). Former Chief Judge Wald of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals agrees with this position. See Patricia M.
Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned From One Hundred Years of the Harvard
Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARv. L. REV. 887, 891 (1987) (contending that
it is unrealistic to expect that judges "will repudiate the basic philosophical views for
which they were chosen" and concluding that "judges with strong political backgrounds
have a way of expressing their views through their work on the bench").
"'
Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R., 692 F.2d 1107, 1112 (7th Cir. 1982).
See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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point of legal doctrine. 6 5 There is something to the distinction
between general legal criticism and expressions of case-specific
bias. The Seventh Circuit employed this distinction when it refused to disqualify Judge Grady from the contingent fee case.
The court stated that Judge Grady's "general tenets are not so
case-specific that they would predetermine his position in this
particular case."1' 66
There are at least three reasons, however, why this specificgeneral distinction, even if controlling, should not have led to
the disqualification of Judge Sarokin in Haines. First, as Judge
Weinstein points out in his contribution to this Panel, disqualification would not have been considered had Judge Sarokin toned
down his language in even a minor way. It is common for judges
in a written opinion to criticize or even ridicule a position taken
by a litigant or conduct by a litigant at or before trial. 0 7 It is
difficult to see how the costs of disqualification, including what
could be a de facto dismissal on the merits, are justified by semantics and stylistic distinctions. It is also disturbing to think
that an appellate court can, through the threat of disqualification, monitor the style as well as the substance of a district
judge's written opinions.
Second, assuming pre-decision on the merits is a concern,
Judge Sarokin's language can be fairly construed as a reference
to the issues presented by the discovery motion, rather than a
reference to the merits.16 8 Judge Sarokin accused the tobacco industry of being perhaps the king of "concealment and disinformation."' 69 Since the question before the court was one of

"' This argument is made forcefully by Professor Freedman, supra notes 53-88 and
accompanying text, and by Joseph McLaughlin, supra notes 110-19 and accompanying
text, in their contributions to this Panel
I" Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R., 692 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1982).
167 See, e.g., United States v. Wolf, 787 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1986) (criticizing a lawyer's tactics in a case as "forensic suicide").
1 Judge Sarokin was clearly of the view that the language he employed in Haines
was pertinent to the discovery issue before him. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 799
F. Supp. 466 (D.N.J. 1992) ("I fear for the independence of the judiciary if a powerful
litigant can cause the removal of a judge for speaking the truth based upon the evidence,
in forceful language that presents the precise issue for determination."). Certainly Judge
Sarokin's language must be considered a reference to the discovery motion if judges are
to be given the benefit of a presumption of impartiality. Professor Freedman argues,
however, that under the judicial disqualification statute, the presumption runs the other

way. See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
169

Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 683 (D.N.J. 1992).
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discovery, it is not out of line to describe the defendant's position as one of concealment. Regardless of the merits of the privilege argument, concealment of the documents under the cloak of
privilege was precisely what the tobacco industry sought to accomplish. More importantly, Haines sought disclosure under the
crime-fraud exception to the privilege. Haines claimed that the
documents were not protected by the privilege precisely because
they were used to perpetrate a crime or fraud of concealment
and disinformation as to the perils of cigarettes.'170 The application of the crime-fraud exception will often mirror the substantive questions of crime, fraud or concealment that are to be adjudicated at trial. 171 But that is hardly a reason to disqualify a
judge who expresses a view in the context of a discovery motion
that crime, fraud and concealment are afoot. If that were true,
every judge who decided that otherwise privileged documents
were subject to the crime-fraud exception would be disqualified
from the trial on the merits. 1 2 The alternative, requiring judges
to repeat a mantra, such as "in finding the crime-fraud exception to the lawyer-client privilege applies, a court is careful to
reserve judgment on the ultimate issue of whether the defendants have perpetuated a fraud," is no less absurd.
Third, even if Judge Sarokin's language indicates some disposition to decide against the tobacco industry on the merits, it
is hardly a universal result that a judge is disqualified for so expressing himself or herself. As Professor Gillers points out in his
contribution, "bias, after all, is what we want judges to have after they gather information" through the litigation process.'1 3
Indeed, the Supreme Court made this point forcefully in United
States v. Grinnell Corp.'14 The defendants in Grinnell, a com170 The New York Times has reported that federal prosecutors in Brooklyn are conducting a criminal investigation of possible conspiracy and fraud by tobacco companies
in concealing information, and are seeking to obtain the documents that were held under
seal in Judge Sarokin's court. See Ralph Blumenthal, Stalled Tobacco Suit is Revived
By Ruling, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1993, at B5.
1
See generally United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
172 Likewise, every judge in an antitrust case who decided that a defendant was subject to the jurisdiction of the forum on the grounds of conspiracy would have to be disqualified from the trial on the merits. See Daniel J. Capra, Selecting an Appropriate
Federal Court in an InternationalAntitrust Case: PersonalJurisdiction and Venue, 9
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 401, 422-25 (1986).
17I

74

See supra p. 1087.
384 U.S. 563 (1965).
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plex antitrust case, argued that Judge Wyzanski, the trial judge,
was biased against them. They based their argument on the fact
that, at a pretrial motion to limit the issues to be tried, Judge
Wyzanski stated that his views on the merits were "more extreme than those of the government. 1 "75 The Supreme Court
unanimously rejected the argument that Judge Wyzanski's comment reflected impermissible bias in favor of the government
and against the defendants. The Court stated that for the alleged bias to be disqualifying, it "must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis
other than what the judge learned from his participation in the
case.""" The Court concluded that "any adverse attitudes that
Judge Wyzanski evinced toward the defendants were based on
his study of the depositions and briefs which the parties had requested him to make. 17 7 If a judge can be disqualified merely
on the basis of judicially-obtained information, it will, as the
District of Columbia Circuit has recognized, have a "drastic" effect on the judicial process. 7 8
Of course it may be true that, in the words of one commentator, "events in the courtroom so incite [the judge] to personal
hostility as to render him incapable of fair judgment on remaining issues.
But surely it must be the rare case in which it can
be confidently concluded that a judge has become (or even appears to be) so personally biased by events in the courtroom as
to warrant disqualification. Most courts have operated under the
fair presumption that a judge can overcome personal rancor,
frustration or favoritism and render an impartial judgment.8 0

175
'1"

Id. at 582.
Joseph McLaughlin, in his contribution to this Panel, relies heavily on the dis-

qualification upheld by the Supreme Court in Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22
(1921); see supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. Yet Berger is distinguishable
from the situation in Haines because the judge in Berger explicitly relied on extrajudicial
information. The Grinnell Court distinguished Berger on this point.
177 Some courts have held, consistently with the Third Circuit but inconsistently
with Grinnell, that a judge can be disqualified on the basis of accezs to information
gained through the judicial process. See Note, Disqualificationof Federal Judges for
Bias or Prejudice,46 U. CHL L Rav. 236 (1978) [hereinafter Disqualification].
17M United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 131, 132 n.297 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
179 See Disqualification,supra note 177, at 254.
180 See Hagans v. Andrus, 651 F.2d 622 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 859 (1981)

(judge cannot be disqualified from a sex discrimination case for his comment that the
plaintiff "went a long way as a woman" before being denied a promotion).
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The fundamental question posed by this Panel discussion is
whether judges should be entitled to a presumption of impartiality. If Judge Sarokin is to be given the benefit of the doubt, it is
hard to argue that his opinion in Haines is anything more than,
as he put it, "forceful language that addresses the precise issues
presented for determination."' 81
Professor Freedman argues on the basis of the judicial
disqualification statute 82 that there should be a presumption in
favor of disqualification. He notes, correctly, that the statute
was amended by Congress to broaden the grounds of disqualification and to indicate that a federal judge has no "duty to
sit."' 83 He relies heavily on the statutory language that disqualification is necessary when the judge's impartiality "might reasonably" be questioned, and emphasizes the "might" rather than
the "reasonably." Professor Gillers argues for a more moderate
construction of the statutory language, but nonetheless appears
to apply at least a mild presumption of partiality to the lan84
guage employed by Judge Sarokin in Haines.1
It is interesting to note that this statutory exegesis is misplaced in the context of Haines. The Third Circuit did not rely
upon and never even cited the judicial disqualification statute
and its purportedly permissive language. Rather, the court relied
in a conclusory fashion on its supervisory power. If a statute
mandates a presumption of partiality, so be it. But it is simply
wrong for a circuit court, in the exercise of its supervisory pow-

An oft-cited case, relied on by the Third Circuit in Haines, in which the trial judge

was held to have gone beyond the pale is Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 596 F.2d 152 (6th

Cir. 1979). In ruling on the plaintiffs preliminary injunction motion, the trial judge in

Nicodemus referred to the defendants as "villains ... interested only in feathering their
own nest at the expense of anybody they can." Id. at 155. I have doubts that the trial
judge should have been disqualified in Nicodemus. The reviewing court should think
twice about imposing the substantial costs of disqualification where the judge has merely
given a strongly-worded view of the merits on the basis of the evidence and where the

very question before the judge was whether the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the
merits. Even assuming that disqualification was warranted in Nicodemus, it seems apparent that the language used by Judge Sarokin in Haines was far more even-tempered
than the language employed by the Nicodemus trial judge.
181 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 799 F. Supp. at 466 (D.N.J. 1992).
182 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
183 See also Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 870 (1988)

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The amended statute also had the effect of removing the so
called "duty to sit," which had become an accepted gloss on the existing statute.").
184 See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
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ers, to employ a presumption of bias against its district
judges.1 15
More importantly, and contrary to Professor Freedman's argument, the judicial disqualification statute, fairly read, does not
impose a presumption of bias. Professor Freedman emphasizes
the term "might" in the statute, but the word that follows
"might" is the word "reasonably." It is only where bias might
"reasonably" be found that the presumption is warranted. Otherwise, disqualification would be a remedy in any case where a
litigant could spin a scenario in which the judge might be partial. The Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp."" case,
relied on by Professor Freedman, does not stand for the broad
proposition that partiality is presumed. It merely held that the
trial judge's "temporary lapse of memory" as to a disqualifying
circumstance was no defense.18 7 Moreover, in the course of its
opinion, the Court in Liljeberg made clear that "there need not
be a draconian remedy for every violation of §455(a). '" 188 If there
is any presumption of disqualification that can be taken from
Liljeberg, it must fairly be limited to cases in which the judge
has a direct or indirect financial interest at stake. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has, in its few cases on judicial disqualification,
clearly employed a presumption that federal judges will remain
impartial arbiters of the facts and law before them. The Court
has stated that judges are "assumed to be men of conscience and
intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular contro-

185 In the subsequent case of In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir.
1992), the Third Circuit, while probably wrong on the merits as Judge Weinstein points
out, at least relied explicitly on the judicial disqualification statute. See supra notes 3438 and accompanying text.
Notably, in Baylson v. Disciplinary Board, 975 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1992). the Third
Circuit took a considerably less aggressive view of the extent of a federal court's supervisory power. In Baylson the court held that the supervisory power could not be used to
prohibit federal prosecutors from using a grand jury subpoena to obtain fee-related information from a criminal defense counsel
188

486 U.S. 847 (1988).

187 It

bears noting that the five-person majority in Liljeberg (two of whom are no
longer on the Court) appeared to believe that the trial judge was in fact aware of the
financial interest in the litigation on the part of the University, of which the judge was a
fiduciary. See 486 U.S. at 866-69. The Court also noted that the trial judge erred when
he failed to recuse himself even after he admittedly became aware of the financial interest of the University. Id. at 862 & 866-69.
I" Id. at 862.
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'
versy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances."I"
No judicial
system can guarantee that a judge will be a tabula rasa. Nor
would it be a good thing if judges were made that way.
Employing a presumption of judicial partiality, in order to
maintain the appearance of impartiality, is misguided for another reason: it runs contrary to other lines of authority where
impartiality and fairness are presumed. For example, the Supreme Court has established a heavy presumption in favor of the
impartiality of jurors. Even where jurors are exposed to inflammatory pretrial publicity, it is generally presumed that they can
exclude these influences and render a verdict based on the evidence. The Court has applied this presumption even in capital
cases. 90 Would it not be anomalous to presume that jurors in
capital cases are impartial even when carrying preconceived notions into the courtroom, but that judges are biased when commenting on the basis of evidence before them?
In most situations, we, presume that trial judges can put
aside preconceived notions and that their impartiality will not
be affected by even the most inflammatory circumstances. So for
example, if two criminal defendants are tried in a jury trial, the
prosecution is generally not allowed to proffer the confession of
one of the defendants if it is not admissible against the other;
the risk is too great that the jury will use the confession against
both. 9 ' But there is no such prohibition in a bench trial, since it
is presumed that the judge can fairly segregate the evidence admissible against one defendant from that admissible against the
other. 92 Similarly, Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
requires exclusion of evidence where its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.193 But the prejudicial, inflammatory effect of evidence is not considered in a -bench

"I See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941) (sending a letter to The
New York Times criticizing a Supreme Court decision does not mandate disqualification
from subsequent proceedings in the same case).
190 See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (exposure to extensive pretrial
publicity as to prior crimes and the details of a charged crime did not affect juror impartiality);'Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (Court refuses to find that a jury is
biased when it is "death-qualified," since an impartial jury is one that will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts, and there was no indication that the presumption of impartiality was overcome).
'"" See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
192 See Rogers v. McMackin, 884 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1989).
" FED. R EVID. 403.

1993]

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

trial, since Rule 403 is concerned with evidence that might inflame the jury and cause it to decide the case on an impermissible basis. It is presumed that a judge will overcome the inflammatory nature of the evidence and render an impartial
verdict.""
It could be argued on policy grounds that a rule of liberal
disqualification is needed to preserve the public's confidence in
our court system. As Professor Arthur Miller has stated, "public
confidence in American courts involves a belief in the fairness
and impartiality of the tribunal."' This may be true, but it
does not follow that disqualification should be liberally granted.
Initially, it is anomalous that the public's belief in impartiality
would be effectuated by a presumption-dipositive in close
cases like Haines-thatthe judge is in fact biased. Also, while
the importance of the public's perception of impartiality cannot
be denied, the costs imposed by liberal disqualification must be
considered. Those costs are so profound as to require courts to
employ a strong presumption of impartiality and to refuse disqualification except in the most egregious cases.
The substantial costs of disqualification in a particular litigation, in terms of educating a new judge, have already been referred to, and are ably addressed by Judge Weinstein in this
Panel. But there are other costs as well. Excessive concern over
the appearance of impartiality is simply an invitation to gamesmanship, judge-shopping and satellite litigation, especially by
parties who use hardball litigation tactics as a modus operandi. 6 We have had recent experience with satellite litigation
'91 See 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTm'S EDFwscz ' 403
[03] (1990) (referring to the influence of prejudicial evidence on the jury). Recently, the
Third Circuit distinguished Haines and refused to disqualify a district judge from a case
on remand, even though the judge had clearly sought to circumvent the Third Circuit's
mandate in a previous ruling in the case. See Blasband v. Rales, 979 F.2d 324 (3d Cir.
1992). The court viewed the district court's failure to abide by a previous mandate as
merely the district court's "frustration" with what it viewed as an incorrect determination of the law by the court of appeals. Id. at 329. In other words, the Third Circuit
assumed that a court's "frustration" with the rule of law was less serious than a court's
"frustration" with a party-even though the former "frustration" led to a decision that
was completely incorrect on the merits. Id. at 328-29. This prioritization by the court of
appeals is not self-evident.
'" Arthur Miller, Public Confidence in the Judiciary:Some Notes and Reflections,
35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROs. 69, 74 (1970).
198 An R.J. Reynolds lawyer has been quoted as stating that the tobacco industries'
courtroom victories have been based on a strategy of making the lawsuits "extremely
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under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and it
has not been pretty. The Rule 11 litigation explosion has led to
proposed limitations on the Rule which are likely to be implemented. 197 The Third Circuit should learn from our experience
with Rule 11 and refuse to disqualify a judge except in the most
compelling circumstances.
Another cost of liberal disqualification is its chilling effect
on judicial writing and decisionmaking. 19 8 Federal judges should
not have to edit their opinions to assure that some sentence or
phrase may be misconstrued as bias against a party by a secondguessing appellate court. In Haines Judge Sarokin wrote a sixteen-page opinion (as well as a dozen or so opinions in other
tobacco cases); he was disqualified for two paragraphs of that
opinion. 99
Judicial writing is an art. Anyone who reads a good deal of
it cannot help but appreciate those who combine judicial decisionmaking with good and interesting writing. 200 It is disconcerting to think that a judge can be disqualified for the use of an
burdensome and expensive" for plaintiffs. The attorney elaborated as follows: "To paraphrase General Patton, the way we won these cases was not by spending money, but by
making that other son of a bitch spend all of his." Blumenthal, supra note 170, at B5.
' See Committee on Professional Responsibility, Proposed Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 47 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF TIlE
CITY OF NEW YORK 65 (1992). On the Rule 11 litigation explosion, see generally GREGORY
P. JOSEPH. SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE (1989); GEORGENE VAIRO.
RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES (Prentice Hall,
2d ed. 1992). The Supreme Court has recently sent a revised Rule 11 to Congress. Many
of the revisions are designed specifically as a response to Rule 11 satellite litigation. See
generally Advisory Committee Comment to Rule 11, as amended (1993).
198On the First Amendment aspects of this controversy, see Kenneth Baynes, Judicial Speech, a First Amendment Analysis, 6 GEO. J. LEG. ETH. 81 (1992).
199 The Third Circuit seemed to rely on the fact that the two suspect paragraphs
received wide press coverage. As Professor Gillers points out, however, it is difficult to
see the relevance of this fact to the disqualification question. See supra notes 103-06 and
accompanying text. It cannot seriously be contended that Judge Sarokin was attempting
to taint the jury pool against the defendants, since the Haines trial would not have begun for months or even years. In Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984), the Supreme
Court recognized that the effect of even the most inflammatory pretrial publicity will
fade over time. Perhaps the Haines court reasoned that press coverage would create an
impression of partiality in the public. But even under the judicial disqualification statute, the question is not whether the public heard about the judge's conduct, but rather
whether a reasonable person who knew about the conduct might reasonably think that
the judge was biased.
200 Justice Scalia and Judges Posner, Easterbrook, Kozinski, Selya, Higginbotham
and Weinstein come immediately to mind as the best of the current crop of opinionwriters.
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aggressive writing style.
Supporters of liberal disqualification point to the need to
preserve the integrity of the justice system. But disqualification
can harm the integrity of the justice system as easily as it can
preserve it. It poorly serves the justice system when the tobacco
industry wins protracted litigation not on the merits, but because it succeeded in having a well-respected judge disqualified
because of his view of the evidence. It poorly serves the justice
system when substantial litigation expenditures are wasted due
to the disqualification of a judge who has presided over proceedings that have been pending for years. It poorly serves the justice system to allow defendants to engage in "judge-shopping" in
the guise of a disqualification motion. Finally, even the appearance of impartiality is not preserved if the reviewing court, in
rushing to disqualification, itself appears partial.
Employing a presumption of impartiality does not mean
that disqualification will never be justified. Certainly if the judge
has a direct or indirect financial interest in the litigation, as in
Liljeberg, even a strong presumption of impartiality will be
overcome. As Professor Gillers points out, the public clearly understands the dangers imposed by a financially interested judiciary.20 1 Disqualification or recusal would also be warranted if the
judge had previously ruled upon the case in a different court.
For example, in the recent New York Court of Appeals case of
Wieder v. Skala, °2 Judge George Bundy Smith, a recent ap-

pointee to the court, recused himself, because he had sat on the
lower appellate court whose decision was appealed to the court
of appeals. Disqualification makes sense in this situation, since
the very notion of appeal is that a different court is hearing the
case; appeal would be a nullity (or at best transformed into a
motion to reargue) if the same judges were transferred to a different court to hear the appeal.
But these are the rare cases. In most cases-and- especially
where the judge is merely expressing an opinion on the evidence
before him or her-the integrity of the judicial system is more
20! See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (in a traffic offense, judge
not impartial where he is also the Mayor, responsible for village finances); Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge not impartial where he is paid for his services only if
the defendant is convicted).
2.2 80 N.Y.2d 628, 609 N.E.2d 105, 593 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1992).
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properly preserved by assuming that judges will decide the case
as fairly as humanly possible on the basis of the evidence before
them. A judicial system based on human decisionmaking should
expect no more and no less.

